Patent Strategy in Pharmaceutical Industry: Are additional patents valuable? by Donghi, Monica
MIPLC Studies
Patent Strategy in  
Pharmaceutical Industry:  




https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
BUT_Donghi_0991-5.indd   1 28.11.13   10:15
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
MIPLC Studies
Edited by
Prof. Dr. Christoph Ann, LL.M. (Duke Univ.)  
Technische Universität München
Prof. Robert Brauneis  
The George Washington University Law School
Prof. Dr. Josef Drexl, LL.M. (Berkeley) 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and  
Competition Law
Prof. Dr. Thomas M.J. Möllers  
University of Augsburg
Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Joseph Straus,  
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and  
Competition Law
Volume 20
BUT_Donghi_0991-5.indd   2 28.11.13   10:15
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Monica Donghi
Patent Strategy in 
Pharmaceutical Industry:  
Are additional patents valuable?
Nomos
BUT_Donghi_0991-5.indd   3 28.11.13   10:15
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
1. Auflage 2014
© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2014. Printed in Germany. Alle Rechte, auch 
die des Nachdrucks von Auszügen, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Über-
setzung, vorbehalten. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of 
the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illus-
trations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and 
storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made 
for other than private use a fee is payable to »Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort«, Munich.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in  
der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische  
Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de  abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche  
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available 
in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de . 
a.t.: Munich, Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, Thesis “Master of Laws  
in Intellectual Property (LL.M. IP)”, 2012
 
ISBN 978-3-8487-0991-5
BUT_Donghi_0991-5.indd   4 28.11.13   10:15
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Preface
This thesis is the result of research and analysis of the patent portfolio
regarding two commercially successful drugs of significant impor-
tance for public health. The investigation has sought to analyse the
various motivations which are behind such patent portfolio as well as
its potential value.
The research culminating in this thesis was carried out as part of
the LL.M. Program at the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center
(MIPLC). It has been generously supported by Dr. Heinz Hammann
and Dr. Ulrich Kebekus of the Boehringer Ingelheim group’s patent
department, who provided access to some crucial data and also took
time to make very helpful comments, for which I am very grateful.
I wish to thank my classmates and friends at the MIPLC LL.M.
Program, for inspiring and supporting me, in particular Hyewon. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my family. This dissertation would
not have been possible without their support.
 
Munich in January 2014 Monica Donghi
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Abstract
Lifecycle management is used by companies attempting to maximize
the value of their product portfolio and it is often referred to by generic
drug manufacturers as “evergreening”. Lifecycle management arises
in response to the increasing generic competition and to the constantly
growing expenses necessary to develop new drugs. Between the var-
ious strategies being pursued this thesis analyses and evaluates two
of them, namely product improvements and product line extensions.
In particular, an evaluation of the patents that follow the basic one and
that accompany the development of a drug from research to market is
attempted.
Two “blockbuster” drugs, Taxotere and Xalatan, were randomly
chosen to carry out such analysis. The patent portfolio of the originator
companies is outlined and some important patents for each area of
research (e.g. formulations, combinations, delivery devices) are short-
ly described. Moreover, the patent filing trends for the two drugs, both
in regard of the originator and in regard of other competing companies
(amongst these also the generics) are schematically shown.
The evaluation of the patent portfolio indicates in both case studies
that the follow-on patents did not stop profit erosion after expiry of
the basic patent. Various obstacles and drawbacks may be identified.
In particular, many patent applications were withdrawn or did not
result in a granted patent. Granted patents that covered valuable im-
provements of the characteristics of the two drugs, such for example
a better formulation in the case of Taxotere, could not be maintained
in some European countries and in the U.S. These follow-on patents
tend to be weaker than the basic one and more difficult to defend for
the originator, which appears to be due to a concomitant increase in
knowledge as research moves forward, enhancing the basis of prior
art to be considered.
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Stronger patents are necessary to protect research that aims to im-
prove a market drug. Such research is criticized by many and seen as
deviating resources from the discovery of NCEs, nonetheless a benefit
for the public arises in many cases from it. Innovation derives also
from small incremental steps.
Abstract
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AGCM Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato
ANDA Abbreviated New Drug Application
Art. Article
CDK inhibitor Cyclin dependent kinase inhibitor
CI Clinical Investigation
C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulation




ECJ European Court of Justice
EMA European Medicines Agency
EFPIA European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
EPC European Patent Convention
EPO European Patent Office
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FDLI Food and Drug Law Institute
Fed. Cir. Federal Circuit
Ger. Germany
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICA Italian Competition Authority
IP Intellectual Property
It. Italy
MRP Mutual Recognition Procedure
NCE New Chemical Entity
NDA New Drug Application
NHS National Health System
O.J. Official Journal
PGF2α Prostaglandin F2 alpha
SPC Supplementary Protection Certificate
R. Rule
R&D Research and Development
TRIPs Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
UK United Kingdom
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Introduction
In 2011, the world pharmaceutical market was worth an estimated
614.6 billion € at ex-factory prizes. The European share of this market
is estimated to be around 26.8% (or 157.3 billion €), with an annual
market growth of ca. 2.6% for the five major European markets.1 The
world’s fastest growing markets are the Brazilian and Chinese mar-
kets with an estimated growth of more than 20%.2
In Europe, the researching pharmaceutical industry (constituting
the so-called “originator companies”) is the leading high technology
industry in terms of investment in research and development. An es-
timated 27.8 billion € has been invested in the year 2010 (a year of
global economic downturn) into research directed towards new chem-
ical and biological entities (drugs) and their development to bring
forth new innovative cures for diseases.3 This figure has more than
doubled in the past ten years, and is over ten times more than the figure
in 1980. The cost of pharmaceutical research has been increasing dra-
matically over the years for several reasons.4 First, with the increasing
knowledge acquired through the various genome projects, science has
become much more complex. Not only have become known much
more potential targets to be addressed by a drug to treat a given dis-
ease, but also much more is known about potential collateral targets
which need to be avoided in order not to cause undesired side reac-
tions.5 As a further consequence of the increased knowledge, also
I.
1 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (hereinafter ‘EF-
PIA’): The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2012 Edition, found at: http://www.
efpia.eu/sites/www.efpia.eu/files/EFPIA_Figures_2012_Final-20120622-003-EN-v 
1.pdf (last visited Aug 2, 2012).
2 Id. at 4.
3 Id. at 9.
4 Id.
5 G. Emilien, M. Ponchon, C. Caldas, O. Isacson and J.-M. Maloteaux, 5 Impact of
genomics on drug discovery and clinical medicine, 93 QJM. Int. J. Med. 391, 394
(2000).
13
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
regulatory obligations in preparation of the data package to obtain
market approval become more and more stringent. This results in ever
larger and lengthier clinical trials and an enhanced rate of failure.6
The increased regulatory obligations have consequently reduced the
period of time where the originator companies have market exclusiv-
ity and the number of drugs which arrive to the market.7 This situation
has led the pharmaceutical industry to pay more attention to the patent
portfolio and to invest into research connected with already marketed
products (such as development of combination therapies).
The climate in which the pharmaceutical industry operates can be
characterized as lacking acceptance of the business model and critical
regarding the value it creates for society. The critics deny any fair
analysis of achievements of commercial pharmaceutical research and
focus on failures – disregarding the industries commitment to supply
the market with safe and efficacious drugs.
This thesis will start by giving a short overview on the different
phases of pharmaceutical drug research and a summary of the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency (EMA) regulations which deal with the ap-
proval of new and generic drugs. Next, this thesis will seek to describe
different kinds of subject matter (e.g. salts, formulations, combina-
tions, delivery devices) pursued by the patent protection. These
patents that accompany the development of a drug from research to
market are referred to as follow on patents and are often considered
by generic companies as “evergreening”.
In particular, it will compare the originators’ patent portfolio built
to protect drugs for two selected pharmaceuticals. It will attempt to
analyse the various motivations which are behind such patent portfo-
lio, whether follow up patents are of value and if not the reasons lead-
ing to this conclusion. This thesis will also highlight challenges that
6 Jack W. Scannell, Alex Blanckley, Helen Boldon, Brian Warrington, Diagnosing the
decline in pharmaceutical R&D efficiency, 11 Nat. Rev. Drug Disc. 191, 193 (2012).
7 Ronald D. Fitzmartin, The challenge of global electronic submission standards in the
biopharmaceutical industry, 32 Drug Inf. J. 745 (1998).
I. Introduction
14
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
this current patent strategy could encounter in the future especially as
far as competition law is concerned.
I. Introduction
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Background
Pharmaceutical Industry – The Development of a New Drug.
The development of a new drug currently takes an estimated 10-12
years, but this time has risen significantly over the past 40 years (by
the end of the 1960’s it took only around 8 years)8. The increase in
development time is linked to several determining factors, namely the
increased regulatory requirements, resulting for example in the need
for a higher number of participants in clinical trials and longer tri-
als.9 An additional factor is the nature of the diseases under study,
where a shift towards the treatment of certain chronic conditions can
be observed. Since treatment in such cases is over a prolonged period
of time (or even lifelong), the duration of the clinical trials necessarily
extends to be able to forecast (or in the best case to exclude) side-
effects during a chronic therapy.10 High failure rates of clinical trials
have been bringing the current estimated average cost of researching
and developing a new drug to about 1 billion €.11 Since the chance of
a chemical entity becoming a marketable drug is about 1 in 10000 and
for every successful project there might be at least 9 unsuccessful
projects (investigational drugs)12 which however also need to be fi-
nanced, it is evident that a launched medicine needs to generate a
continuous and substantial revenue to finance the development of fu-
II.
A.
8 M. Dickson, J.P. Gagnon, The Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, http://
www.discoverymedicine.com/Michael-Dickson/2009/06/20/the-cost-of-new-drug-
discovery-and-development/ (last visited Jul 30, 2012).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 EFPIA supra note 1 at 6.
12 Tudor I. Oprea, Current trends in lead discovery: Are we looking for the appropriate
properties? 16 J. Comp. Mol. Des. 325, (2002).
16
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ture drugs. Or as Jacob LJ put it in very clear words: “The few winners
must pay for all the losers.”13
Such investments are however nearly entirely borne by the origi-
nator companies from their own resources which makes it clear that
a significant and sustained income needs to be generated to be able to
maintain a position in this research intensive area of industry. To fa-
cilitate the understanding of the aforementioned research process, the
following illustrative scheme should be considered:
Figure 1: Phases of the Research and Development Process14
13 Sir R. Jacob, Patents and Pharmaceuticals – a speech given on 28th November 2008
at the presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition’s Preliminary Report
of the Pharma-sector inquiry, found at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pha
rmaceuticals/inquiry/jacob.pdf, at 4, lines 21-22 (last visited Aug 2, 2012).
14 EFPIA supra note 1 at 7.
A. Pharmaceutical Industry – The Development of a New Drug.
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The different stages of the process exhibited in figure 1 show the reg-
istration of a patent application regarding certain chemical entities at
a time 0 and the market authorization at ca. 10 years. At this point it
should not be left out of sight, that the filing of a patent application is
preceded by a time of basic research directed towards the identifica-
tion of a suitable biological target for a given disease followed by the
identification and first round of optimization of chemical compounds
which are suitable for the purpose (e.g. inhibiting a metabolism, a viral
action, bacterial growth etc.). This time may conservatively be esti-
mated to range from 1 to 3 years, depending on the complexity and
the novelty of the biological target.15 During the phase of preclinical
development, several of such optimization cycles are usually being
run through until candidate compounds which are suitable for Phase
I clinical trials are available. While the expenditures of the Preclinical
Phase may already be significant (depending on the disease models
available, some viral diseases can for example only be studied in pri-
mates), the clinical phases do exceed them several times. As part of
the preclinical development of a drug candidate, toxicology and safety
studies as well as studies regarding suitable pharmaceutical formula-
tions and the stability are being carried out. Many compounds fail
already in this stage, as they might have a desirable activity profile,
but turn out to be also toxic. While an early understanding of the in-
teractions with other drugs is desirable, such studies are oftentimes
not being carried out before the completion of Phase I clinical tri-
als.16
New Drug Approval Regulations
The European system offers three routes for the authorisation of
medicinal products, the so-called centralized procedure17 using the
B.
15 Authors own experience from drug research in various pharmaceutical companies.
16 EMA, Guideline on the Investigation of Drug Interaction, (Apr. 22, 2010) http://w
ww.emea.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2010/05/
WC500090112.pdf, at 7 (last visited Aug 2, 2012).
17 Regulation (EC) 726/2004, 2004, O.J. (L 136) 1.
II. Background
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EMA, the mutual recognition procedure18 and the decentralized
one.19 The decentralized procedure (DCP) for medicinal products,
which have not been authorized before in any member state, allows
for the marketing authorisation application to be submitted simulta-
neously in several Member States, one of which acts as the reference
member state and coordinates the process. At the end of this procedure
national marketing authorisations are granted in all the Member States
involved. If the medicinal product has already been granted a mar-
keting authorisation in one of the EC member states, then the mutual
recognition procedure (MRP) is used.20
Article 3 and the Annex of the Regulation21 define the types of
products which fall within the scope, in particular article 3(1) and the
Annex define the medicinal products for which the centralized pro-
cedure is mandatory.22
Generic Drugs Approval.
As far as generics are concerned, pre-clinical tests and clinical trials
are not necessary if it has been demonstrated that the generic product
has “the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active sub-
stances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal
product23, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal
C.
18 Regulation (EC) 764/2008, 2008, O.J. (L 218) 21.
19 Directive (EC) 2004/27, 2004, O.J. (L 136) 34.




21 Supra note 17.
22 Supra note 17, Art. 3(1) and Annex.
23 Art. 10(1) and Art. 10(2)(a) of Council Directive (EC) 2004/27/EC of 31 March
2004, OJ L 136, 34, 39 (2004): “Reference medicinal product shall mean a medicinal
product authorised under Article 6, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8”,
and “which is or has been authorised under Article 6 for not less than eight years
[Data exclusivity 8+2 market exclusivity +1 for new indication] in a Member State
or in the Community”.
C. Generic Drugs Approval.
19
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product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability stud-
ies.”24
In the case where the results of the appropriate pre-clinical tests or
clinical trials shall be provided,25 studies and trials required for ap-
plying for a MA in a Member State do not constitute patent infringe-
ment under the so-called “Bolar exemption”.26 However, the exact
scope of the exemption is unclear and left to interpretation by the
national Courts.27 Up to April 2009, “the aim to harmonize the laws
of the different EU countries regarding the treatment of the acts per-
formed in order to gain the data necessary to obtain a market autho-
rization has been reached only in part.”28
24 Id. Art. 10(2)(b).
25 Id. Art. 10(3): “In cases where the medicinal product does not fall within the defi-
nition of a generic medicinal product as provided in paragraph 2(b) or where the
bioequivalence cannot be demonstrated through bioavailability studies or in case of
changes in the active substance(s), therapeutic indications, strength, pharmaceutical
form or route of administration, vis-à-vis the reference medicinal product, the results
of the appropriate pre-clinical tests or clinical trials shall be provided.”.
26 Id. Art. 10(6): “Conducting the necessary studies and trials with a view to the appli-
cation of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the consequential practical requirements shall
not be regarded as contrary to patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates
for medicinal products.”.
27 Stéphanie Michiels, Béatrice Holtz, Patent exemption for clinical trials: current
status of the Bolar-type provisions in Europe, Life Sci. IP Rev. 68, (2008).
28 See Brief report on the so called “Bolar” Exemption Annex of Union of European
practitioners in intellectual property – Biotechnology Commission, Newsletter,
(May 1, 2009), found at http://www.union-ip.org/union/WebObjects/union.woa#vi
eweditmember, (last visited Sept.1, 2012).
II. Background
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Case Studies-Facts
This section will discuss patent strategies that companies undertake
in the course of developing a drug. This study will be conducted by
highlighting the patent portfolio of two randomly selected successful




Docetaxel (brand name Taxotere) is an “anti-mitotic agent” (Formula
1) the administration of which causes the “inability of cells to di-
vide”.30
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The compound has been originally disclosed in EP 0253738 A131 
belonging to Rhone-Poulenc Santé and market approval in Europe was 
obtained in November 1995.32 The patent protection for the basic 
compound expired in November 2010 in U.S. and European countries. The 
compound is obtained semi-synthetically as much of its core structure is 
obtained by extraction (of baccatin III or desacetyl 10-baccatin III) of the 
needles or bark of the European yew tree (Taxus baccata L.). It was 
designed as an alternative to the drug Taxol (paclitaxel) (Formula 2) which 
was obtained by extraction of the bark of the American yew tree (Taxus 
brevifolia). This tree is however less abundant, slower growing and its 
harvesting was strongly opposed by environmentalists and raised the issue 
of biodiversity conservation.33 
                                                   
30 A. Sulkes, J. Smyth, C. Sessa, L.Y. Dirix, J.B Vermo ken, S. Kaye, J. Wanders, H. 
Franklin, N. LeBail, J. Verweij, Docetaxel (Taxotere), in advance gastric cancer: results 
of a phase II clinical trial, 70 BRITISH JOURNAL OF CANCER 380, (1994). 
31 The application was filed in July 1987 invoking a French application priority: FR 
8610400, filing date 17 July 1986, published as FR 2601675 A1. 
32 In 1995 centralized procedure for cancer drugs was optional: see Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2309/93, art 3(2) 1993, O.J. (L 214) , 163 and Part B of the 
Annex; now centralized procedure compulsory for cancer medicines approved after 
November 2005: see supra note 17, Annex at 51. 
33 George Frisvold & Kelly Day-Rubenstein, Bioprospecting and Biodiversity 






29 The rademarks are property of their respective owne s and are used throughout the
remainder of the thesis without the symbol ®.
30 A. Sulkes, J. S yth, C. Sessa, L.Y. Dirix, J.B Vermorken, S. Kaye, J. Wanders, H.
Franklin, N. LeBail, J. Verweij, Docetaxel (Taxotere), in advance gastric cancer:
results of a phase II clinical trial, 70 British Journal of Ca cer 380, (1994).
21
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The compound has been originally disclosed in EP 0253738 A131 be-
longing to Rhone-Poulenc Santé and market approval in Europe was
obtained in November 1995.32 The patent protection for the basic
compound expired in November 2010 in U.S. and European countries.
The compound is obtained semi-synthetically as much of its core
structure is obtained by extraction (of baccatin III or desacetyl 10-
baccatin III) of the needles or bark of the European yew tree (Taxus
baccata L.). It was designed as an alternative to the drug Taxol (pa-
clitaxel) (Formula 2) which was obtained by extraction of the bark of
the American yew tree (Taxus brevifolia). This tree is however less
abundant, slower growing and its harvesting was strongly opposed by



















The disclosure of docetaxel for the first time offered a sustainable access to 
the compound class and allowed for widespread use in the treatment of 
various types of cancer, including breast, ovarian and non-small cell lung 
cancer.34 
 




The synthetic procedure, disclosed in the basic patent family, while 
allowing for the production of larger amounts of docetaxel was however 
still far from being optimal since it involved an uselective reaction step 
with a consequent substantial loss of product. A company, which has to 
produce material for the various clinical studies and for a possible launch, 
therefore needs to address this issue as can be seen by the large number of 
successive patents in this area. E.g. EP 0336841 A135 disclosed an 
optimized synthesis which is no longer based on a late-stage reaction with 
poor selectivity, but introduces the synthetic fragment (A) (side-chain: 
Formula 1) as complete building block. Hence, any difficult reaction step 
                                                   
34 O. Esposito, M. Bonfill, E. Moyano, M. Onrubia, M.H. Mirjalili, R.M. Cusidó, J. 
Palazón, Biotechnological Production of Taxol and Related Taxoids: Current State and 
Prospects, 9 ANTI-CANCER AGENTS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 109, 110 (2009). 
35 Filed in October 1989, French priority: FR 8804513, (06 April 1988). 
Formula 2
The disclosure of docetaxel for the first time offered a sustainable
access to the compound class and allowed for widespread use in the
31 The application was filed in July 1987 invoking a French application priority: FR
8610400, filing date 17 July 1986, published as FR 2601675 A1.
32 In 1995 centralized procedure for cancer drugs was optional: see Council Regulation
(EEC) 2309/93, art 3(2) 1993, O.J. (L 214) 1, 163 and Part B of the Annex; now
centralized procedure compulsory for cancer medicines approved after November
2005: see supra note 17, Annex at 51.
33 George Frisvold & Kelly Day-Rubenstein, Bioprospecting and Biodiversity Con-
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treatment of various types of cancer, including breast, ovarian and
non-small cell lung cancer.34
Patent Portfolio
Process
The synthetic procedure, disclosed in the basic patent family, while
allowing for the production of larger amounts of docetaxel was how-
ever still far from being optimal since it involved an unselective re-
action step with a consequent substantial loss of product. A company,
which has to produce material for the various clinical studies and for
a possible launch, therefore needs to address this issue as can be seen
by the large number of successive patents in this area. E.g. EP
0336841 A135 disclosed an optimized synthesis which is no longer
based on a late-stage reaction with poor selectivity, but introduces the
synthetic fragment (A) (side-chain: Formula 1) as complete building
block. Hence, any difficult reaction step potentially involving a loss
of material is carried out before the valuable core (baccatin III) (B,
Formula 2) extracted from the natural source is brought into play. This
improved process found by the Rhone-Poulenc group demonstrates
therefore a significant advantage, both from the technical (less diffi-
cult) and the economic (less material loss) point of view.
Successive patents36 in the period from 1989 to 1994 deal with
several alternative preparations of the fragment (A). Moreover, re-
search was also directed towards the improvement of joining the two
2.
a)
34 O. Esposito, M. Bonfill, E. Moyano, M. Onrubia, M.H. Mirjalili, R.M. Cusidó, J.
Palazón, Biotechnological Production of Taxol and Related Taxoids: Current State
and Prospects, 9 Anti-Cancer Agents in Medicinal Chemistry 109, 110, (2009).
35 Filed in October 1989, French priority: FR 8804513, (06 April 1988).
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fragments (A) and (B) together and 6 further patent families37 origi-
nated from this work.
A final process patent discloses the stable crystal form (docetaxel
trihydrate) which is necessary to allow for a storage stable form to be
delivered to the patient (WO 96/01815).38 Docetaxel trihydrate is ac-
tually the form which is packaged into the vials which are market-
ed.39
Hence, process research contributed to the patent portfolio around
docetaxel with 14 patent families as listed by their international ap-
plications.
Formulation
Another problem to be dealt with after the discovery of a potential
drug during preclinical and clinical studies and also after marketing
is the identification of a suitable formulation. Safety problems or sim-
ply the desire to identify a more user friendly dosage form can drive
research in this area. In the case of docetaxel patents from 1990 to
about 1999 regard certain aspects of injectable dosage forms. Taxane
products have low water solubility and traditionally for clinical use
taxane formulations were obtained by addition of ethanol and a sur-
factant.40 This formulation could cause “manifestations of alcohol
poisoning during treatment”.41
The FR 9108527 patent family addressed the ethanol issue and dis-
closed novel stable injectable taxane compositions with low ethanol
b)
37 WO 93/01179, WO 93/18210, WO 94/07876, WO 94/07877, WO 94/07879 and WO
94/10169.
38 The corresponding EP 0770070 filed in 1995 will expire in 2015, the corresponding
US 6022985 was filed in 1997 but can be followed only until its issue date in 2000.
39 L. Zaske, M.A. Perrin, C. Daiguebonne, O. Guillou, Docetaxel (Taxotere® Trihy-
drate) Forms: Crystal Structure Determination from XRPD & XRSCD data, 443-444
Mat. Sci. Forum 411, (2004).
40 John Zhikong He, Docetaxel, IP Front Line, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/arti
cle.aspx?id=24725&deptid=5 (last visited March 11, 2012).
41 Reported in US 5,714,512.
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content. Marketing authorisation in the major markets was obtained
for this new formulation (single vial). Patents of this family will expire
in Europe,42 Canada43 and Australia in July 2012, while expiry in the
U.S.,44 where a paediatric extension was granted, will be in January
2013.45
The successive patent family EP 0671912 B1 protects a formulation
in a twin compartment system which solves the problem of gelling
observed upon dilution of the previously known composition. The
date of expiry of these patents is in November 2013 except in the U.S.
equivalent where paediatric extension was granted until May
2014.46 No opposition has been filed against this patent, which it is
still in force. However, this formulation compared to the challenged
single vial composition appears less practical.
Combination Therapy
Between 1993 and 2009 research activities had also been directed
towards the identification of combination therapies (see figure 2).
However, clinical studies of product combinations can be quite
complex due to potential drug interaction.47
About 10 patent applications regarding combination therapies with
further anticancer agents and antibiotics have been filed.48 For exam-
ple, patent application WO 03/097164 A149 covers the use of doc-
c)
42 EP 0593601 B1 and EP 0593656 B1.
43 CA 2102777 and CA 2102778.
44 US 5,698,582, US 5,714,512 and US 5,750,561.
45 See Zhikong He supra note 40.
46 See Zhikong He supra note 40.
47 Jan I. Drayer, James P. Burns, From Discovery to Market: The Development of
Pharmaceuticals, in BURGER’S MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY AND DRUG DIS-
COVERY, 251, 280-282, (Manfred E. Wolff ed., 1995).
48 WO 94/10995, WO 96/22101, EP 0827745, EP 1093811, EP 1295597, WO
03/097164, WO 2004/037258, EP 1537871, FR 2887454, WO 2010/067027, EP
1169059 B1.
49 Filed on 15 May 2003.
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etaxel in combination with doxorubicin and cyclophosphamide (fur-
ther anticancer agents) in adjuvant therapy of breast and ovarian can-
cer. The application was restricted to breast cancer during proceedings
because of lack of support for the treatment of ovarian cancer and then
refused on ground of obviousness. The applicant appealed the deci-
sion.50 This combination has been approved either by FDA and EMA
and it is the current primary treatment for breast cancer.51
The binary combination of docetaxel and cyclophosphamide is
covered by EP 0827745 B1.
Another application WO 02/07648452 regards the combination of
Taxotere and the CDK-inhibitor flavopiridol. Clinical trials for such
combinations are ongoing or being evaluated.
Of these patents 3 have been revoked,53 3 were not granted and 1
is under appeal.
New Uses
In addition, new uses for docetaxel have been identified: the treatment
of parasitic diseases (as covered by WO 95/01790) and the treatment
of hepatoma (WO 01/15675). Further research which accompanied
the already marketed drug was directed towards the identification of
biological markers allowing for the prediction of docetaxel response,
resistance or sensitivity (WO 00/39590, WO 2006/062811 and WO
2009/140304). Hence, these patents are more related to diagnostic
d)
50 Appeal T 1902/09 ongoing. See EPO register: document of July 24, 2012 found at
https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP03738122&lng=en&tab
=doclist (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).
51 John Crown, Michael O’Leary, Wei-Song Ooi, Docetaxel and Paclitaxel in the
Treatment of Breast Cancer: A Review of Clinical Experience, 9 (suppl. 2) The
Oncologist 24, 30, (2004).
52 Filed in March 2002.
53 E.g. EP 0827745 B1: binary combination (docetaxel/cyclophosphamide), or EP
1169059 B1 (docetaxel/ Rhumab HER2) revoked by the BundesPatentGericht
(BPatG) [Federal Patent Court]: BPatG Mar. 1, 2011, BECK-RECHTSPRECHUNG
(BeckRS), 14402, 2011 (Ger.).
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procedures and allow for better determination of the target patient
population.
Derivatives
The research around docetaxel did not diminish the efforts in basic
research to find new innovative drugs. Attempts to improve various
aspects (for example the anti-tumoural activity) of docetaxel resulted
in nine patent families dealing with novel derivatives of taxoids.54
This research work successfully led to the marketing of Jevtana
(cabazitaxel), approved in the U.S. in June 2010. Cabazitaxel was first
disclosed in the patent WO 96/30335 (oral formulation WO
00/41482). Despite attempts to switch to the new therapy, docetaxel
is still part of the widely used first line therapy. Cabazitaxel currently
finds more use in retreatment of patients previously treated with a
docetaxel-containing regime.55 For some types of cancer there is cur-
rently no data (no studies done) at hand which proves an added benefit
of cabazitaxel over docetaxel, while for others it has been demon-
strated that the life time is significantly improved for cases of refrac-
tory cancer.56
Use of Procedural Provisions: Supplementary Protection
Certificates (SPCs)/Patent Term Extension
In Europe, Supplementary Protection Certificates can be requested
from the national patent offices under Regulation (EC) 496/2009
e)
3.
54 WO 92/09589, WO 93/23389, WO 94/08984, WO 94/11547, WO 94/20484, WO
95/01969, WO 95/11247, WO 96/03395 and WO 97/23473.
55 Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, IQWiG Reports – Commission
No. A11-24 Cabazitaxel – Benefit assessment according to § 35a Social Code Book
V, (Jan. 12, 2012), found at https://www.iqwig.de/download/A11-24_Extract_Cab
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which codifies Council Regulation (EEC) 1768/92.57 The SPC had
been introduced for the purpose of allowing originator pharmaceutical
companies to benefit of a maximum market exclusivity of 15 years
from marketing authorisation, whereby the certificate may have du-
ration up to 5 years.58 Both Regulations foresaw transitional peri-
ods.59, 60
The keystone of the patent protection for docetaxel in Europe is EP
0253738 which has been filed in July 1987. Said patent was to expire
after a patent term of 20 years in July 2007. Market approval for do-
cetaxel in Europe was obtained only in November 1995,61 after more
than eight years of research to determine safety and efficacy of the
drug in various clinical trials, which were necessary to fulfil the regu-
latory obligations. To facilitate the recovery of the high cost of R&D
the originator company could avail itself of the application for an SPC.
Further protection of docetaxel until November 2010 was obtained in
9 EU Member States, while in Switzerland the extension was granted
until December 2011.62 The rights conferred by the SPC did however
57 Regulation (EC) 469/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 152) 1 supersedes Council Regulation
(EEC) 1768/92, 1992, O.J. (L 182) 1.
58 SPCs must be requested within 6 months after a valid authorization to place a medic-
inal product on the market has been granted in accordance with the Directive
2001/83/EC, see Council Regulation (EEC) 469/2009, Articles 7(1) and 3(b), 2009
O.J. (L 152) 1, 2-3.
59 Council Regulation (EEC) 1768/92, Article 19, 1992, O.J. (L152) 1, 6: it was stip-
ulated that for products which had received marketing authorisation after 01 January
1985 the 6 month period would start from the date the Regulation entered into force.
Initially, only 4 exceptions were foreseen: for Belgium and Italy, the first marketing
authorisation might have been received as early as 01 January 1982; for Denmark
and Germany, not earlier than 01 January 1988. Exceptions were later also applied
for three countries of the European Economic Area established in 1994 which at that
point in time were not members of the European Union: Austria, Finland and Nor-
way. The former two countries have since then joined the European Union (1. Jan-
uary 1995), the latter has remained a European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-state
within the European Economic Area. For Austria, the 1982 limit data is relevant, for
Norway and Finland 1988 is the limit date.
60 For provisions regarding transitional periods relating to the enlargement of the com-
munity see Regulation (EC) 469/2009, Article 20, 2009 O.J. (L 152).
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not stop the Israeli generic pharmaceuticals company Teva Pharma to
request (via its Dutch subsidiary) and obtain market authorization for
docetaxel from the French authorities. Presuming an imminent in-
fringement of its rights, Sanofi-Aventis filed a lawsuit against Teva
Pharma with the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris.63 The court
however, following French case law, ruled in favour of the defendant
and decided that the request for a market authorization does not con-
stitute an infringement. According to the court a market authorization
requested by and granted to the defendant does not automatically al-
low to assume that a generic product will actually be marketed prior
to the expiry of the claimant’s rights.64, 65 Permission for paediatric
studies targeting nasopharyngeal carcinoma was granted by the EMA
in May 2008.66 Results of the studies are not yet in the public domain.
A similar patent term extension is available also in the U.S.67 The
basic patent US 4,814,470 was due to expire in July 2007 and the
marketing approval of Taxotere was obtained in 1996. Therefore, the
requirements of extension of the patent term were met and an exten-
sion of 1035 days was granted.68 A further paediatric exclusivity69 (6
63 Aventis v. Teva: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Mar. 17, 2011, http://kluw
erpatentblog.com/files/2010/12/2010-08-19_TGI_Paris_Aventis_Teva_translation.
pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
64 Pierre Véron, Submission of a tender: imminent infringement?, Wolters Kluwer
Patent Blog, (Dec. 8, 2010) http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2010/12/08/submission-o
f-a-tender-imminent-infringement/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
65 Simon Klopschinski, Arzneimittelrechtliche Genehmigungsverfahren, staatliche
Preisfestsetzung und Kostenerstattung für Arzneimittel im Lichte des Patentschutzes
– Rechtsprechungsübersicht Belgien, Deutschland, Frankreich und Österreich,
GRURInt. 993, 1000, (2011).
66 EMA, EMA decision of 16 May 2008 on the application for agreement of a Paediatric
Investigation Plan for Docetaxel, Taxotere (EMEA-000029-PIP01-07) in accor-
dance with Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council as amended, found at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_l
ibrary/PIP_decision/WC500005480.pdf, (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
67 35 U.S.C. § 156: Extension of patent term.
68 See Image File Wrapper at the Public Patent Application Information Retrieval
(PublicPAIR) of the USPTO.
69 21 U.S.C § 355A: Pediatric studies of drugs.
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months) for the treatment of solid tumours extended the patent pro-
tection of Taxotere to November 2010.70
Conclusion
In its patent strategy Sanofi-Aventis focused mainly on three inno-
vation tracks: formulations, combinations and process. Use of SPCs
was also important to prolong in Europe and in the U.S. the life of the
patent application that first disclosed docetaxel.
The patent filing trends for docetaxel (figure 2) show a first incre-
ment of filing activity in 1996 after launch followed by a second surge
in 2002 and a third one in 2006. However, around 280 entities con-
tributed actually to such filing whose distribution is shown in figure
3.71 Of particular note is the large number of individual and academic
inventors in the case of docetaxel, which is likely due to the particular
interest cancer research attracts both in terms of public grants and in
terms of public visibility. However, just contributing to total patent
numbers, most of these patents appear to be neither a real challenge
for the position of the originator, nor are they of particular commercial
interest. There seem to be only a few cases, where, in the phase after
marketing had started, Aventis secured patents through collaboration
with university partners.72
As already mentioned, a substantial number of patents (75%) is
directed towards the research fields of formulation, combination and
process (figure 2). However, only a limited amount of these has been
submitted by the originator company. In the formulation track for ex-
ample, although the number of patent families is very high, only three
patent families belong to the originator company after 1996 (launch
year). Other two companies, Forest Laboratories (14 patents) and
4.
70 See Zhikong He supra note 40.
71 The data forming the basis for the graphic display of the patent filing trends has been
kindly provided by the Patent Department of Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH.
72 For example WO 02/070498 has been obtained by collaboration with a group at the
State University of New York.
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Nitto Denko Corp. (7), were very active in this area. The same trend
can be seen in the field of drug combinations, the number of active
entities was quite high and in addition to Sanofi-Aventis other com-
petitors companies showed great interest. For example, Pfizer filed
eight patent families, Roche Holding AG five, while Sanofi-Aventis
accounted for six families. Finally, as process research is concerned,
the two top companies in terms of filing numbers in addition to Sanofi-
Aventis are the two generic manufacturers Dr Reddy’s Laboratories
and Shanghai Parling Pharma-Techco.
Additionally, a number of patent applications (3%) have been di-
rected both by the originator as well as by external research to alter-
native compounds, i.e. derivatives of the taxan core with great re-
semblance of the marketed drug.
Figure 2: Patent filing trends: docetaxel73
73 Supra note 71.
A. Taxotere
31
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Figure 3: Top patent applicants for docetaxel (474 patents)74
Xalatan
General
Latanoprost (trade name Xalatan: Formula 3) is an ophthalmic solu-
tion used to treat glaucoma and ocular hypertension by reducing ele-
vated intraocular pressure.
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The compound has been originally disclosed in EP 0364417 B175 be-
longing to Kabi-Pharmacia. The drug was launched in 1996 in the
U.S. and in Europe76. The patent protection for the basic compound
expired in March 2011.
During previous research at Columbia University77 it had been
found that prostaglandine PGF2α and its iso-propyl ester could lower
the intraocular pressure in patients with open-angle glaucoma. How-
ever, these compounds had low therapeutic value due to the poor
cornea permeability and their side effects (e.g. ocular irritation, con-
junctival hyperemia). Further studies at Kabi Pharmacia addressed
these issues. Variation in the structure of PGF2α allowed achieving
the desired effects. Furthermore, a more efficacious compound was
obtained by separating the 15R-epimer (Formula 3). The ester prodrug
is hydrolyzed on the cornea and the parent acid is active as a selective
prostaglandin F-receptor agonist and reduces the intraocular pressure




The initial method of synthesis covered by the basic patent family (EP
0569046 resp. WO 90/02553) was based on the final separation of the
two epimers at C15 (Formula 3) resulting therefore in a tedious pro-
cedure and in low yield taking in account the fact that only the 15R-
epimer is desired. Further studies were therefore directed to solve the
2.
a)
75 Filed in September 1989 and invoking a Swedish application priority: SE 8803110
and SE 8803855.
76 E.g. Marketing Authorisation in Sweden 18 July 1996: see European Patent Register,
Legal status: EP 0364417, https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=
EP89850294&lng=en&tab=legal, (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
77 U.S. 4,599,353.
78 Information about Xalatan were taken from Sajiv K. Nair, Kevin E. Henegar, Modern
Drug Synthesis 329-330 (Jie Jack Li, Douglas S. Johnson eds., 1st ed. 2010).
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issues to obtain latanoprost in good yield, large amount and desired
purity. The patent family EP 0544899 claims the process for the
preparation of the 15R-epimer (latanoprost), based on a selective re-
duction of a key intermediate79 and the various intermediates of the
synthesis. This patent expired in June 2012. An earlier patent family
EP 0495069 was also directed to solve the same issue. However, it
covers only an advanced intermediate and the selective reduction is
more tedious being based on the use of protecting groups.80 The last
patent of the originator company (US 6,689,901, filed in June 2002)
covers instead the selective preparation of the other (15S) epimer. This
could be the result of a failed process strategy.
Formulation
It appears that no particular research interest had been directed to the
identification of specific formulations with improved characteristics.
As the standard therapy using latanoprost involves a topical applica-
tion directly to the target organ (eye), seemingly no particular diffi-
culties needed to be overcome. Only one patent has been obtained by
Pfizer with respect to a different dosage form, EP 1471890 B1. This
patent claims an intraoral dosage in form of a disintegrating tablet
with the effect that the drug is taken up via the oral mucosa of the
treated subject. It must be noted however, that this patent is neither
directed specifically to latanoprost, nor does this appear to the skilled
artisan the most straightforward way of administering the drug, which
has to act on the eye.
b)
79 EP 0544899 B1 claims 1 and 2: reduction of the α,β-unsaturated enone key inter-
mediate.
80 EP 0495069 B1: claim 1.
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Combination Therapy
The earliest claimed combination therapy of latanoprost is the one
which combines the drug with a tyrosinase inhibitor as claimed in EP
0977575 B1. The specific reason behind this combination is the
avoidance of a known side effect of latanoprost which very often leads
to an increased pigmentation of the eye.81
One of the more important patent applications in this field appears
to have been WO 02/38158 A1. This application dealt with a combi-
nation of timolol and latanoprost, which is the basis for a marketed
composition named Xalacom®. During the European proceedings
however, Pharmacia had not been able to establish novelty over a
published experimental clinical report82 and the application finally
was abandoned.83
Further combinations for which patent applications had been filed
or for which patents have been granted are those with other drugs
known in the field of glaucoma treatment.
As such, a series of applications has been directed to combining
latanoprost with inhibitors of Cyclooxygenase-2. WO 02/05815
claims a combination of the blockbuster celecoxib (trade name Cele-
brex®) with latanoprost. The application entered the European phase
and later was withdrawn.84 WO 2005/021004 makes the same claim
but did not enter the regional phases. WO 2005/099691 again claims
and exemplifies the combination, but results withdrawn after entry
into the European phase.
A claimed combination of latanoprost with Pfizer’s antihyperten-
sive (diuretic) eplerenone (trade name Inspra®) resulted in the grant
of US 7,015,210.
c)
81 See EP 0977575 B1, description lines 8-22.
82 M. Diestelhorst, Brigitta Almegård, Comparison of two fixed combinations of la-
tanoprost and timolol in open-angle glaucoma, 236 Graefe’s Archive for Clinical
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Pfizer’s ongoing research on glaucoma led to the discovery of new
active compounds. Some patents covering such compounds also in-
clude claims to combinations with Xalatan.85 Further patent applica-
tions were directed to combinations involving carbonic anhydrase in-
hibitors which are also used as treatments for glaucoma and ocular
hypertension. None of these86 however, progressed to a granted patent
as they all result to be withdrawn in the European phase.
New Uses
With respect to new uses identified by the originator it appears that
no substantial amount of research had been dedicated to it. The only
application in this field is WO 95/11003 which is directed to a method
of using latanoprost and its analogues for increasing the pigmentation
of tissues and especially hair. However, this is not the fruit of dedi-
cated studies into identifying further purposes for the compound at
hand, but a known side-effect of the drug.87, 88 Though the application
entered the European phase, it results as withdrawn as novelty was
objected.89
Delivery Devices
Two applications were directed to methods of treatment using a spe-
cial applicator for the drug latanoprost.90 The applicator is in form of
an aerosol discharger and dispenses an effective amount of the drug
directly to the eye. While certainly giving the product a competitive
d)
e)
85 E.g. WO 2006/048750 A2, EP 1893609 B1, WO 2006/134481 A1.
86 WO 2004/014352, WO 2008/075155.
87 Upon the topical use in the eye, the eyelids darken as well as does the iris colour due
to increase in pigmentation.
88 M.A. Johnstone, Hypertrichosis and increased pigmentation of eyelashes and adja-
cent hair in the region of the ipsilateral eyelids of patients treated with unilateral
topical latanoprost, 124 Am. J. Ophthalmol. 544, (1997).
89 See procedural documents available via EPO register.
90 Published as WO 2004/028420 A1 and WO 2004/028421 A1.
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edge with respect to ease of application, this method of administering
the drug to the eye would not have created any market entry barrier
as there is a sufficient number of generic ways to do so. In any case,
these applications have not been pursued and are deemed with-
drawn.91
Packaged Product
In 2005, Pharmacia & Upjohn filed two patent applications92 in the
United States exclusively which are directed to a special method of
packaging latanoprost into plastic vials, as well as to the plastic vials
filled with the drug per se. It appears, that there existed a need to
stabilise the packaged drug and that the company had identified a
solution for this. However, both applications were objected to by the
USPTO under the aspect of unity of invention93 and the company by
that time must have had decided not to pursue the issue any further,
as both patent applications result abandoned by mid-2008.
A further patent application has been filed with respect to the pack-
aging of a combination of the drugs timolol and latanoprost, which is
sold under the trade name Xalacom.94 Also this application has been
refused due to lack of unity and was then abandoned.95
Use of Procedural Provisions
Divisional of Basic Patent
The basic patent EP 0364417 B1 gave rise to 9 divisional applications
filed between 1993 and 2003 which are directed to more specific em-




91 Supra note 89.
92 Published as US 2005/0049311 A1 and US 2005/0287325 A1.
93 See USPTO supra note 68.
94 Published as US 2005/0048122 A1.
95 See USPTO supra note 68.
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1225168 B1 filed in 2002 covers various prodrugs including Xalatan.
This patent was revoked by the EPO in 2011 and fell under the scrutiny
of the Italian competition authority (ICA)96. Pfizer appealed the de-
cision of the EPO. In the course of the procedure Pfizer filed a new
main request and further auxiliary requests. With regard to the new
main request, the opponents to the patent withdrew their opposition.
In May 2012 the Board of Appeal remitted the case to the first instance
with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of the main request
as presently on file.97 Instead of being directed to latanoprost and its
ester analogues, the patent now claims the use of Xalatan in speficic
amounts for a specific indication.98
Supplementary Protection
The basic patent protection for latanoprost in Europe is derived from
EP 0364417 which has been filed in September 1989. Said patent was
to expire after a patent term of 20 years in September 2009. The regu-
latory obligations to be able to commercialize latanoprost had been
fulfilled within seven years after filing and thus first marketing ap-
proval for Xalatan could be obtained in Sweden on 18 July 199699 and
subsequently in other EU countries. Based on the SPC regulation,
extension of the patent term up to 15 years after the first MA could
be requested nationally.100 Further protection of latanoprost was thus
obtained in various EU Member States and gave additional coverage
until July 2011.101 In addition, Pfizer in early 2011 was able to request
b)
96 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) (Italian Competition
Authority), Jan. 30, 2012 Bollettino 5 (XXII-2) (It.).
97 T 2402/10 available in the EPO register under the number of the patent in suit.
98 EPO register, set of claims of 9.3.2012.
99 See European Patent Register supra note 76.
100 Council Regulation 469/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 152) 1.
101 In Switzerland as non-EU country until September 2011, based on the Swiss MA.
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additional coverage under the regime of paediatric extension.102 This
was granted and brought the overall protection to 17 January 2012.
For unknown reasons, no supplementary protection had been request-
ed in Italy, where the patent term was due to expire in September 2009,
20 years after the patent application had been filed.
In the United States latanoprost was covered by the patent US
5,296,504 which had been filed in December 1992 and expired in
March 2011. Patent term extension could not be requested because
FDA approval was obtained in June 1996 and therefore the remaining
patent term exceeded 14 years.103
Conclusion
In the case of Latanoprost prolongation of patent protection was ob-
tained through supplementary protection certificates and paediatric
extension.
A substantial number of patents (93%) have been filed after the
launch of the product in 1996 which were mainly (71% of these) di-
rected to formulation, processes and delivery devices as can be seen
from figure 4.104 However, of these only few have been filed by the
originator company. Of the reported patent families only 13 belong
to Pfizer or its predecessors and the last application attributable to the
originator dates to 2003.
A significant number of the patents directed to processes have been
filed by Johnson Matthey (15%), a company specialized in catalyst
and process development. Their patent filing activity started in 2001,
4.
102 Council Regulation 1901/2006, Article 36, 2006 O.J. (L 378) 1, 12: according to
the Regulation (EC) on medicinal products for paediatric use additional 6 month
protection period may be obtained, when the holder of a patent or a supplementary
protection certificate files study results in paediatric patient populations with the
respective authorities.
103 35 U.S.C. § 156 (c)(3).
104 The graphics reports the number of families for priority date. If a specific patent
refers to more indications, it has been counted for each category.
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about five years after the launch of Xalatan when its success was pre-
sumably already evident. Regarding the patents directed to delivery
devices, figure 4 shows that they were filed mainly from 2007 onward.
However, various companies are active in this area and amongst them
the more prolific is QLT Inc., a biotechnology company whose re-
search is focussed on innovative ocular products.
Figure 4: Patent filing trends: latanoprost105
105 Supra note 73.
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Figure 5: Top patent applicants for latanoprost (118 patents)106
The third most prolific area of research covers formulations. This area
is dominated by Santen Pharmaceutical (25%) which moreover is the
major competitor of Pfizer (2.3%) (figure 5), as far as latanoprost is
concerned, and which in 2011 announced the positive outcome of
Phase II studies for Catioprost®. Catioprost is a preservative-free
formulation of latanoprost with reduced side-effects and thus regarded
as next generation glaucoma treatment.107
106 Id.
107 Press release Novagali Pharma, Catioprost Phase II positive results (Sept. 8, 2011).
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Discussion
Lifecycle Management: Criticism and Supports
It has been reported that “[o]ver the next few years, patent exclusivity
will expire for drugs with combined annual sales of $140 bil-
lion.”108 With increasing generic competition and constantly growing
expenses for developing new chemical entities (NCEs) into successful
drugs, drug companies are forced to maximise the value of their prod-
uct portfolio. To deal with this challenge, active lifecycle management
represents a response and comprises the efforts of improving return
from R&D investments.109 Various strategies are being pursued and
among these figure product improvements and product line exten-
sions.110
Members of the generic industry argue that “[...] such practices are
anticompetitive and result in higher cost of healthcare to the patient
and government bodies [...]”.111 The strategies employed are often-
times pejoratively called “evergreening” strategies.112, 113, 114 This
negative connotation stems from the impression, that the originator
drug companies have the ability to obtain multiple patents on a drug
which in turn leads to an effective extension of the patent term. Such
IV.
A.
108 Angelo DePalma, Patent expiration: Innovate or die, Eyeforpharma, Feb. 3, 2011,
available at http://social.eyeforpharma.com/.
109 John Fraher, Life-Cycle Management: The Link to Drug Delivery, 2 Drug Deliv.
Tech. 158, (2002).
110 Leighton Howard, Use of patents in drug lifecycle management, 4 J. generic
medicines 230, 236, (2007).
111 Id.
112 Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: a common practice to protect new drugs, 29 Nat.
Biotechnol. 876, (2011).
113 C. Scott Hemphill, Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, patent challenges, and ef-
fective market life in pharmaceuticals, 31 J Health Econ. 327, (2012).
114 Gaurav Dwivedi, Sharanabasava Hallihosur, Latha Rangan, Evergreening: A de-
ceptive device in patent rights, 32 Technology in Society 324, (2010).
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strategy is seen as impeding entry of generic drugs to the market. In
this context, one cannot fail to observe that the term “evergreen-
ing”115 in itself is entirely incorrect and inappropriate as it implies that
the same invention is repeatedly protected. However, the patents ob-
tained are generally different from one another and are directed to
various aspects. The patenting strategies employed generally conform
to the letter of the law. GlaxoSmithKline took publicly position on
this issue. The innovator company argues that no evidence has ever
been produced that those practices coined “evergreening” have an
impact on patients or markets.116 Furthermore, GlaxoSmithKline
pointed out three key issues. First, improvement patents are available
only if they meet the normal requirements of patentability. Second, it
is disputed “that improvements subject to later patents are not medi-
cally important and should not be encouraged.” The patent system
provides an incentive to improve products and “the importance of
such improvements is assessed by the market and clinical demand.”
Third, there is no motivation why patented improvements should de-
lay generic competition, because the patent systems allow and foster
competition.117
The generic industry holds against the point of view that in their
opinion a multitude of low-quality patents is granted which to be re-
voked and worked around binds a considerable amount of resources
and of money.118 The same issue of quality of late secondary patents
was also considered by the EU Commission in its recent sector in-
quiry.119 The Commission recognized the importance of subsequent
115 Id.
116 GlaxoSmithKline Briefings, Evergreening, (March, 2007), found at http://www.g
sk.com/policies/GSK-and-evergreening.pdf. (last visited, July 25, 2012).
117 Id.
118 See Howard supra note 110.
119 Research Paper in Law Cahiers juridiques, Nicoleta Tuominen, Patenting Strategies
of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition
Policy No 1 (2011), at 16.
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improvements made to the initial invention.120 They agreed that such
contributions, if inventive, merit patent protection but they call for a
closer scrutiny of patent applications.121
Patents that try to protect improvements of a drug incorrectly are
deemed to prolong the life of the basic patent. First, they do not impede
the commercialization of the drug, whose patent is expired. Second,
everyone is free to invest into research and identify (incremental as
well as substantial) improvements to existing inventions by building
on the existing knowledge. The only advantage the originator initially
has over a competitor is the know-how generated on the way to the
first patent and finally the marketed drug. However, this know-how
came at a price (the investment into research) to the originator com-
pany, this price being generally orders of magnitude higher than the
one paid for later increments. As some authors observed the use of
the clinical know-how gained can lead to cheaper and faster devel-
opment of novel applications, offering a benefit for both industry and
patients.122
Given the continuous advances in science and the consequent gain
of knowledge the inventive step disclosed in some of these applica-
tions is smaller than in a pioneering patent. Notwithstanding the fact
that such patents are considered weaker and of low quality, an inven-
tive step may oftentimes be identified. The gain from such incremental
improvement is to the benefit of all. If no protection would be avail-
able for these improvements identified during the lifecycle manage-
ment and if all researching industry would focus only on providing
“blockbuster” drugs, which then however would not be refined into
the best possible formulation or made with the most economic pro-
cess, then it may be expected, that due to reduced revenue less drugs
120 European Commission, Communication from the Commission – Executive Sum-
mary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, (July 8, 2011) at ¶1323,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_p
aper_part1.pdf, (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
121 Id. at ¶1324.
122 Christian Sternitzke, Knowledge sources, patent protection, and commercialization
of pharmaceutical innovations, 39 Research Policy 810, 812, (2010).
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will reach the market in the end, and fewer medical needs will be
addressed.
Further Filing Strategy: Commercial Value
Further research to improve properties of a drug and to address unmet
needs benefit not only the industry but also the public. Such research
needs incentives but it is debatable whether the strategy of further
filing is of any value in this context. The further filing connected with
a blockbuster drug might present various problems also on the side of
the originator. Such problems can be highlighted through the analysis
of the case studies reported in this work. First, innovation tracks such
as formulation, combination, new uses and process have many short-
comings for the originator; second, the patent strategy pursued by an
originator in a dominant position can fall under scrutiny of competi-
tion law.123
It is also important to underline that such strategy per se does not
preclude competition but on the contrary can foster it both in regard
of innovation (as this work will try to evidence) and of price. On this
point it has been shown in the past that 80% of the new entrants to an
existing class (follow-on drugs) were launched in the U.S. with a price
discount and the discount rate was on average 26%.124
Furthermore, inventions whose patent have expired can be mar-
keted by a generic competitor, since improvement patents are nar-
rower in scope.125
B.
123 E.g. Xalatan: see AGCM supra note 96.
124 Joseph A. DiMasi, Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research
and Development, 22 Pharmacoeconomics 1, 12 (2004).
125 See GlaxoSmithKline supra note 116.
B. Further Filing Strategy: Commercial Value
45
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Innovation Tracks
Formulations
A new formulation may bring an added benefit to patients, for exam-
ple when providing a reduced dosage frequency, improved uptake of
the drug into the body (and thus reduced dosage amount) or when it
is possible to switch from an injectable dosage form to an oral dosage
form.126 In the U.S. new formulations comprising a previously ap-
proved drug have the potential to obtain further three years of market
exclusivity based on the so-called Clinical Investigation (CI) Exclu-
sivity which may be requested with a supplemental applica-
tion.127, 128 This gives the possibility to the originator company to
delay generic entrance, if the supplemental application is filed close
to the end of the lifetime of the chemical entity’s patent and if a switch
to the new formulation is made. Such provision, on the other hand, is
not available in Europe, where a new formulation will be of added
value to a company only if the market will support the switch from
old to new. This is likely to occur only if there is a real added benefit.
As such may be mentioned formulations improving the dosing regi-
men which have an established positive impact on patient compli-
ance.129, 130 The additional investment made into research towards
providing such added benefit needs and deserves an incentive such as




126 Patrick J. Crowley, Luigi G. Martini, Formulation design: new drugs from old, 1
Drug Discovery Today: Therapeutic Strategies 537, (2004).
127 21 C.F.R § 314.70 (g) and 21 C.F.R § 314.108 (b)(5)(ii).
128 To support CI Exclusivity the sponsored clinical trials must be new, essential to
approval, sponsored by the applicant and not just a mere bioavailability study.
129 W. Kruse, W. Eggert-Kruse, J. Rampmaier, B. Runnebaum, E. Weber, Dosage
frequency and drug-compliance behaviour – a comparative study on compliance
with a medication to be taken twice or four times daily, 41 Eur. J. Clin. Pharm. 589,
(1991).
130 Ami J. Claxton, Joyce Cramer, Courtney Pierce, A systematic review of the asso-
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With respect to patent protection some considerations must be
made. Competitors finding themselves in the position to need to work
around such improvement patents covering a marketed drug product
tend to challenge these.131 It has been argued that such challenging
could also reflect a low quality of the application or patent grant-
ed.132 The most direct challenge is directed at failure to fulfil the non-
obviousness requirement.133 In the case of docetaxel the FR 9108527
patent family has the capacity to procure between two to three years
of additional exclusivity.134 However, it was challenged several times
in various jurisdictions. In the UK, EP 0593656 B1 was revoked by
the Patents Court135 and as a consequence, Aventis initiated a cen-
tralised limitation procedure136, 137 with the EPO (07 January 2009)
which led to the reissue of this patent as EP 0593656 B3. The reissued
patent covers a single specific formulation for Docetaxel. Nonethe-
less, this patent got invalidated in Germany138 and Sweden.139
US and Canadian equivalents were challenged in October 2007 by
Hospira and successively by Apotex.140, 141 Sanofi-Aventis responded
131 See Zhikong He supra note 40.
132 See Sector Inquiry supra note 120 at ¶1313.
133 Dan-Feng Mei, Josephine Liu, Michael A. Davitz, Formulation Patents and Der-
matology and Obviousness, 3 Pharmaceutics 914, 917, (2011).
134 Patents of the FR 9108527 patent family which covers a formulation with low
ethanol content and for which marketing authorisation was obtained were to expire
in Europe in 2012 and in the U.S in January 2013.
135 HC 08 C01493, UK Pat. J. 6227, September 24, 2008, and UK Pat. J. 6239, De-
cember 17, 2008.
136 EPC 2000 Art. 105a.
137 Designed to avoid litigations over validity and to enhance legal certainty, useful for
example if relevant prior art is found after grant. For more details see Derk Visser,
The annotated European patent convention, at 241, (17th ed., 2009).
138 BPatG June 15, 2010, BeckRS, 24071, 2010 (Ger.): The BPatG held obvious the
exchange of surfactant against another known surfactant with fewer side effects.
139 Sweden: February 10, 2011 (source: Patent- och registreringsverket, Svensk Patent-
databas).
140 The two generic companies filed an ANDA based on paragraph IV certifications
[21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)] against four US patents.
141 The Thomson Corporation, News & Highlights from week 39, Curr. Pat. Gaz., Sept.
26 2008.
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by filing infringement actions142, 143 and the two cases were consoli-
dated for the trial. Apotex and Hospira contended that the patents in
suit were invalid, since the technology was not new and the formula-
tions would have been obvious. In September 2009 the Delaware
District Court ruled in favour of the defendants,144 and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed this finding.145 Claim 5146 of
US 5,750,561 and claim 7147 of US 5,714,512 were held obvious. The
Court refused to impose additional limitations to the claims as sug-
gested by Sanofi because the company had initially agreed on their
interpretation.148 In claim 5 the use of an exclusive wording (“less
than”) instead of an inclusive wording (describing an exact range)
rendered it vulnerable to interpretation in a way which excluded com-
pletely the features which are supposed to be present, albeit in a min-
imal amount and reduced it to nothing else than just a perfusion per
142 For two of the equivalents in both Canada (CA 2102777 and CA 2102778) and the
U.S. (US 5,714,512 and US 5,750,561). In the U.S. Aventis Pharma SA v. Hospira
Inc. Civil Action (CA) No. 1:07-CV-00721-GMS (D. C. Delaware Sept. 11 2007).
143 Aventis Pharma SA v. Apotex Inc. CA No. 1:08-CV-00496-GMS (D.C. Delaware
Aug. 27, 2008).
144 Aventis Pharma SA v. Hospira Inc. and Apotex Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 305, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101442 (D. C. Delaware Sept. 27, 2010): the validity of some
claims was denied due to obviousness and indefiniteness; those claims actually
infringed were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
145 Aventis Pharma v Hospira Inc., 2011 F.3d 1018 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2012).
146 Claim 5 reads: “A perfusion, which contains approximately 1 mg/ml or less of
compound of formula as defined in claim 1, and which contains less than 35 ml/l
of ethanol and less than 35 ml/l of polysorbate, wherein said perfusion is capable
of being injected without anaphylactic or alcohol intoxication manifestations being
associated therewith.”.
147 Claims 1, 6 and 7 read: “1. A composition comprising a compound of the formula
(I) in which Ar is unsubstituted phenyl, R7 is phenyl or t.butoxy, R6 is hydrogen,
R5 is acetyloxy or hydroxy, R3 and R4 taken together form an oxo radical, R1 is
hydroxy and R2 is hydrogen, said composition being dissolved in a surfactant se-
lected from polysorbate, polyoxyethylated vegetable oil, and polyethoxylated cas-
tor oil, said composition being essentially free or free of ethanol.
6. The composition of claim 1, wherein R5 is hydroxy and R7 is t.butoxy.
7. The composition of claim 6, wherein said surfactant is polysorbate.”.
148 See Aventis supra note 144 at § II.A.
IV. Discussion
48
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
se, which then was held obvious.149 In Claim 7 of US 5,714,512 the
term “essentially free of ethanol” was interpreted by all parties in-
volved as “not comprising more than 5% of ethanol”.150 Not being
specifically directed to perfusions got then interpreted to the effect
that it also comprises “stock solutions”. A specific stock solution ful-
filling the requirements was already disclosed in US 4,814,470151 and
therefore the range was regarded as being anticipated.152 Additionally,
the Court affirmed the finding of inequitable conduct153 and held that
neither of the two patents at issue was enforceable at all.154, 155
Another point to be made regarding this innovation track is that
such formulation patents do not stop other companies to work in the
same field in an attempt to find alternatives or even improvements
and to patent around them as demonstrated by both the Taxotere and
the Xalatan case. As far as Taxotere is concerned formulation research
was actually one of the most prolific fields of patenting which at-
tracted a number of competing companies trying to solve the main
issue of solubility. In the case of Xalatan, patent filing on formulations
was carried out not only by the originator but mainly by Santen Phar-
maceutical (Novagali). Their research led to the discovery of Catio-
149 No basis can be found in the patent’s claims, the specification or in the prosecution
history suggesting that the claimed perfusion must satisfy certain safety or efficacy
standards: See Aventis supra note 145 at § II.A.
150 Id. at § II.B.
151 Col. 10: composition example.
152 See Aventis supra note 145 at § II.B. The Court actually holds the claim obvious,
but interestingly then argues with anticipation.
153 At the time of filing Aventis had not disclosed all prior art known to it and material
to the subject-matter claimed. The test for inequitable conduct requires that the
information which is withheld from the Patent Office is material to the determina-
tion of patentability, for example such prior art which, if known to the Patent Office,
would prevent the grant of the patent (“doctrine of unclean hands”): see Kevin
Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Un-
clean Hands, 21 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 147, 152-153, (2006).
154 See Aventis supra note 145 at § II.C.
155 Eddy D. Ventose, Federal Circuit clarifies patent unenforceable for inequitable
conduct, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Pract. 551, (2012).
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prost.156 Catioprost is a preservative-free formulation of latanoprost
which deals with the corneal toxicity side effect caused by the pres-
ence of an antimicrobial agent in the formulation.157’158 Clinical stud-
ies on this new drug are still ongoing. Another example of such situ-
ation is the commercial successful reformulation of methylphenidate
used for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Alza
(Johnson & Johnson) developed the drug Concerta, which is a once a
day drug and replaced Ritalin three times a day drug which had to be
taken by children at school.159 Ritalin is marketed by Novartis.
It must be concluded therefore, that patent filings in the field of
drug formulations do not preclude competition on innovation. As long
as there is need and room for improvement there will be competing
research done in this area and this will inevitably lead to a bouquet of
patents stemming from various companies. Moreover, competing for-
mulations of a given drug might each try to achieve a market share.
A substantial market share may however only be expected, if a for-
mulation shows a competitive edge over other formulations. Due to
the substantial head start in research which the originator company
has over its competitors in many cases one of the best formulations
may stem from him. This however, does not exclude that lateron an-
other company may come up with a significantly improved formula-
156 For Phase II studies results see Dahlia Ismail, Mourad Amrane, Jean S. Garrigue,
Ronald Buggage, A phase II, randomized study evaluating the safety and efficacy
of Catioprost® compared to Travatan Z® in subjects with glaucoma and ocular
surface disease, 89 Acta Ophthalmol. 188, (2011).
157 Philippe Daull, Ronald Buggage, Grégory Lambert, Marie O. Faure, Janet Serle,
Rong F. Wang, Jean S. Garrigue, A Comparative Study of a Preservative-Free La-
tanoprost Cationic Emulsion (Catioprost®) and a BAK-Preserved Latanoprost
Solution in Animal Models, J. Ocul. Pharm. Ther., (online ahead of print: June 6,
2012).
158 This issue was already addressed by the use of less aggressive preservative in Tra-
vatan Z as compared to Travatan (by Alcon): see Christophe Baudouin, Luisa Ri-
ancho, Jean-Michel Warnet, Françoise Brignole, In vitro Studies of Antiglaucoma-
tous Prostaglandin Analogues: Travoprost with and without Benzalkonium Chlo-
ride and Preserved Latanoprost, 48 Invest. Ophthalmol. Vis. Sci. 4123, (2007).
Travatan however shows other side effects over Xalatan.




https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tion, as in the case of Xalatan or Concerta. Moreover, the finding of
a new formulation does not preclude the offering by a generic com-
pany of the older version; the choice is left to the market.
However, to have better chances to sustain an invalidity attack and
therefore to be more valuable, patents protecting formulations might
need to be drafted as specific as possible. This is due to the fact that
the pharmaceutical compound itself represents part of the prior art and
that issues surrounding the administration of the specific compound
could be common to a variety of drugs and therefore may be solved
by analogy.160 This is not always the case but such reasoning may
form the basis of a non-obviousness challenging. This view is sup-
ported by the fact that nearly 40% of the challenges to formulation
patents are successful, as compared to only 23% in the case of patents
on active pharmaceutical ingredients.161, 162 Hence, formulation
patents are significantly weaker than basic patents and cannot be re-
garded as the best option to avoid profit erosion.
160 McNeil-PPC v Perrigo Company, 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2008). Perrigo
claimed that McNeil’s Patent US 5,817,340 was invalid for obviousness. The patent
disclosed an impermeable coating to mask the bitter taste of a certain active ingre-
dient. The court found that all of the relevant limitations, i.e. using a coating for
taste masking of drugs were known in the prior art, even though not for the specific
compound in object. Moreover, under KSR, a skilled artisan would have been mo-
tivated to combine the teachings to mask the bitter taste of the active ingredient and
make the drug more marketable.
161 Steven C. Carlson, Willy Chang, “Obviously” a challenge: Patent survival statis-
tics, 5 Ind. Biotechnol. 172, (2009).
162 The European Commission’s sector inquiry found that, in the period 2000 to 2007,
originator companies engaged in nearly 700 cases of patent litigation with generic
companies concerning the sample of products investigated. 54% of the cases were
initiated by the originator company. Secondary patents accounted for 64% of all
litigated patents while primary patents made up the remaining 36%. Of all cases
where a final judgment was taken (149) generic companies won 62%: see European
sector inquiry supra note 120 at ¶¶ 610, 611, 628 and summary on p. 238.
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Combinations
Combination therapies can not only facilitate the treatment compli-
ance of patients but also can result in an improved therapeutic effect
(synergism). In particular, “chemotherapy drugs are most effective
when given in combination”.163 The use of drugs with different mech-
anisms of action can decrease the insurgence of resistant cancer cells
which will not respond anymore to the therapy. Moreover, in this way
often intolerable side effects can be diminished by using lower dos-
es.164 The same is true for other diseases. Research in this field is
therefore desirable and of public interest.
As far as the patents that protect such research are concerned, some
drawbacks must be mentioned. First prior art can be difficult to over-
come. For example, patent coverage for the combination of timolol
and latanoprost (successfully marketed as Xalacom) could not be ob-
tained as novelty over a published experimental clinical report could
not be established.165 Upon expiry of the patent on latanoprost also
the combination lost exclusivity.
Moreover, in a large number of cases the non obviousness require-
ment appears to be the more challenging obstacle of these patents.
The fact that the single drugs are published prior art can result in an
obvious benefit deriving by their combination and therefore patents
to such combinations are subject to refusal of grant or vulnerability
for invalidity claims. In some cases even the combinations may have
had a prior use. For example the Sanofi-Aventis patent on the triple
combination166 (WO 03/097164) was refused on grounds of obvious-
ness.167 During the proceedings in the European Phase of this appli-
b)
163 The Merck Manual Home Health Handbook, Combination Cancer therapy, http://
www.merckmanuals.com/home/sec15/ch182/ch182h.html (last visited on March
11, 2012).
164 Id.
165 See Diestelhorst supra note 82.
166 Docetaxel/Doxorubicin/Cyclophosphamide.
167 Decision of the examining division on application EP 03 738 122 (06 March 2009),
retrieved from European Patent Register.
IV. Discussion
52
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845251288, am 03.12.2021, 00:10:36
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
cation, the examining division held that the prior art actually disclosed
the claimed combination and that the only difference was the patient
population targeted (first line treatment vs. adjuvant treatment). Based
on the prior art, it was argued, that the selection of the new patient
population would be made with a reasonable expectation of success
(certainty of success not being required), otherwise also no investment
into clinical studies would be made. Moreover, there was no indica-
tion in the art that such a therapy would fail, but the skilled artisan
would rather reckon with a nearly 50% chance of success. Therefore,
the use of the known therapeutic combination in a new patient popu-
lation was regarded as obvious to the skilled person. Sanofi-Aventis
appealed this decision.168 The corresponding US application (US
20040146494) was abandoned.169 In the meantime a number of pro-
ducers have obtained MA for generic docetaxel (e.g. Teva, Mylan,
Accord, Hospira) in Europe170 and U.S.171 Their summary of product
characteristics included as proposed indication the claimed triple
combination and in general all possible combinations.172
A second weakness of combination patents could be the off-label
use and the difficulty to prevail in infringement actions (especially if
the combination is not delivered via a single pill). In the case of do-
cetaxel, for example, due to the fact that the three drugs are not being
comprised in a single formulation, the doctors173 could still use any
commercially available version of the drug in the combination treat-
ment, especially, since a variety of combination therapies are poten-
168 T1902/09, ongoing (16 July 2009).
169 See USPTO supra note 68.
170 EMA assessment reports for generic docetaxel.
171 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Summary Review for Regulatory Action,
NDA# 22234, 04 March 2011.
172 As part of an application for a marketing authorisation, a summary of the product
characteristics including therapeutic indications and dosages must be submitted.
These information need to be reflected also in the package leaflet accompanying
the drug.
173 Under many jurisdictions, the prescription by a physician to an individual of a given
drug for a given indication is exempt from patent protection: see Ulrich Storz,
Biopatent Law: Patent Strategies and Patent Management 25-41 (Ulrich Storz, 1st
ed. 2012), at 40.
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tially possible and it will be difficult to determine, to what extent
infringement (if found at all) may have occurred if the patent (WO
03/097164) would be granted. Traditionally, case law concerning
certain combinations or specific use in patient groups174 has found
against infringement, if the package leaflet did not explicitly refer to
the patented therapeutic indication (e.g. drug combination or patient
group) or dosage.175 Therefore, it appears that the generic companies’
ability to provide very limited summary of product characteristics
documents (and thereby relatively restricted package leaflets; “carv-
ing out”176) might significantly limit the value of combination claims.
However, a recent judgment from the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales indicates that to establish infringement it may be sufficient to
show that the defendant (the potential infringer) knew or ought to have
known that some of the end users would make the modifications nec-
essary to bring the product within the scope of the claims.177 Trans-
ferring the decision to a combination of drugs, it may be enough that
a generics company supplies a drug which may be combined with
further drugs and that the generics company should have known that
some of the end users actually will combine it. As the end users are
exempt from finding infringement (basis: the patient taking a drug
174 WO 03/097164 actually comprises a combination of both: use of a drug combination
in a certain patient group.
175 See for example Landgericht Düsseldorf [Regional Court] Feb. 24, 2004,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR, here-
inafter ‘GRUR’] 193, 2004 (Ger.): Claim 1 of the patent was directed to a combi-
nation of ribavirin and interferon to be used in hepatitis C patients having a viral
load of more than 2 million copies of the virus per millilitre of serum. The defendant
was selling ribavirin capsules with a package leaflet referring to a combination of
ribavirin with interferon, however without specifying the patient group. The court
concluded that there was no infringement.
176 Terry Mahn, Protecting New Investments in Old Drugs, Issue 2 FDLI Update Mag-
azine 38 (2009), available at http://www.fr.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
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combination is making a private, non-commercial use), the supplying
company will be potentially be an indirect infringer.178
An advantage in patenting drug combinations is the possibility to
obtain a SPC. With respect to this topic the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) has recently handed down two judgements
which clarify how EU countries should apply SPCs to combination
products.179, 180 These judgements address a number of unclear points
in the SPC regulation. The first point regards the question in what way
Article 3(a) of the Regulation181 may be interpreted with respect to a
patent, claiming only one active ingredient from a combination of
active ingredients in an authorised drug and whether such patent can
be used to obtain an SPC for that drug. The court decided that “Article
3(a) [...] must be interpreted as precluding [...] from granting a sup-
plementary protection certificate relating to active ingredients which
are not specified in the wording of the claims [...]”.182 An SPC for a
combination of two compounds A and B may therefore only be grant-
ed, if the literal claim wording recites specifically a combination of
both. A second point addressed by the CJEU was whether an SPC
could be issued for a combination of two active ingredients, if the
marketed product comprises more active ingredients than just these
two. This regards an interpretation of Article 3(b) of the same Regu-
lation and the Court decided positively on this issue, stating “that
provision does not preclude […] from granting a supplementary pro-
tection certificate for a combination of two active ingredients, corre-
sponding to that specified in the wording of the claims of the basic
178 Ravi Srinivasan & Chris Milton, EPO second medical use claims: The skinny SmPC
loophole, Managing IP Magazine Supplement Life Science IP Focus (9th ed. 2011)
available at http://www.managingip.com/IssueArticle/2918674/Supplements/EP
O-second-medical-use-claims-The-skinny-SmPC-loophole.html?supplementListI
d=83781, (last visited Sept 7, 2012).
179 ECJ, C-322/10, Medeva BV v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks, November 24, 2011.
180 ECJ, C-422/10, Georgetown University, University of Rochester, Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks,
November 24, 2011.
181 Supra note 57.
182 See Medeva supra note 179 at 28.
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patent relied on where the medicinal product for which the marketing
authorisation is submitted in support of the application for a special
protection certificate contains not only that combination of the two
active ingredients but also other active ingredients”.183, 184
In view of the above rulings, it may be expected that SPCs granted
on combinations which have not been explicitly mentioned in the
claims will be affected and that national courts will invalidate
them.185 This is confirmed by the fact that first courts have already
stayed preliminary injunctions previously granted under SPCs for
combination drugs, where the patent the SPC was based upon does
not fulfil the criteria set out by the CJEU with respect to Article 3(a)
of the Regulation.186
In light of the disadvantages mentioned and also of the clarification
made by the CJEU regarding SPC, patents and patents applications
protecting or seeking to protect such research might be of limited
economic value. As emanates from the present case studies patents
and applications covering combinations rarely provide additional in-
struments that could avoid profit erosion after the expiry of the basic
patent. Nonetheless, there have been success stories. An example is
Symbicort® (Asthma treatment), a combination of budesonide and
formoterol. This drug combination of AstraZeneca with annual sales
in 2010 of 2.7 billion dollar replaced the blockbuster Pulmicort®
183 Id. at 42.
184 See Georgetown University supra note 180 at 35.
185 Ulrich M. Gassner, Supplementary protection certificates for combination prod-
ucts: new combinatorics?, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Pract. 52, 60, (2012).
186 Novartis v. Mylan, Tribunale Ordinario di Roma Sezione Nona, R.G. 68881/2011,
November 25, 2011 found in the blog Anna Pezzoli, SPC protection for combination
products: future scenarios, (Feb. 2012), http://www.eupatent.com/spc-protection-
for-combination-products-future-scenarios/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2012). A prelimi-
nary injunction granted by that Court on November 11, 2011 based on an SPC
Novartis holds for its drug combination Co-Tareg (Valsartan and hydrochloroth-
iazide) was stayed after Mylan appealed this decision on grounds of the CJEU
decision cited under ref. 179.
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(budesonide) ensuring high revenue for at least further 3 years after
budesonide patent expiry.187
Process
The sector inquiry of the European Commission looked in detail at
patent strategies of originator companies. Amongst the additional
(secondary) patents covering a multitude of aspects of the drug com-
pound figure also those related to processes of manufacture.188 In the
view of the originator companies these “[p]rocess patents are not the
biggest block but can put generics off if a superior chemistry job is
done.”189 In some cases, it is the chemistry itself which may stop a
generics company to develop a process to a drug, for example when
it does not possess the specific know-how to handle certain synthetic
steps which are notoriously dangerous on large scale.190
However, the possibility to invent around is still the main weakness
of process patents. For example, in the case of Taxotere although the
compound marketed is the trihydrate salt, for which a preparation
process is protected by the originator at least in Europe until 2015,
profit erosion after expiry of the basic patent could not be avoided.
Process patents extend to the direct product made by the claimed pro-
cess,191, 192 but if a generic company will be able to make the product
c)
187 Annual Report and Form 20-F Information, AstraZeneca, Therapy Area Review
Respiratory & Inflammation 67, (2010).
188 OECD Policy Roundtables, “Roundtable on Generic Pharmaceuticals 2009” DAF/
COMP(2009)39, October 5, 2010 at 147.
189 Id.
190 Cases are known, where the originator company had outsourced the synthesis of a
drug to a specialised fine chemicals supplier, who can handle certain particular
chemistry steps and from where, after expiry of the process patents, also the generic
drug company sources its supplies. Two of these cases are the antibiotic minocy-
cline and the angina treatment isosorbide mononitrate. The first compound requires
a unique raw material, while the second synthesis involves a potentially explosive
reaction step, see: Michael McCoy, Generic Drugs, 80 Chem. Eng. News 23,
(2002).
191 See EPC Art. 64(2).
192 Bengt Domeij, Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe, at 287 (2000).
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(in this case docetaxel trihydrate) using a different process then they
can still market it.193
The view of the originator company expressed above is easily un-
derstandable if one considers that a synthetic process for a drug has
to be cost effective in order to allow for a profit margin. If the origi-
nator company has done an excellent job to identify the most
favourable synthetic route, and if such route is still protected by a
patent on the process once the patent on the compound itself is no
longer available, then this may pose a difficulty to a generic company
which is not to be underestimated. If the generics company does not
succeed to come up with an alternative process (which in turn it will
of course attempt to protect by a own process patent to protect its
investments194) allowing it to produce at a cost which is low enough
for successful market entry, then the secondary protection has fulfilled
its purpose.
Concluding, it must be stressed, that process patents do not come
at zero cost to the originator company, and that a considerable amount
of resources is put generally into the development of an industrial
large-scale synthesis.195 For example in the case of Taxotere, while
the uninvolved bystander looking (with hindsight) at the methods per
se might consider them to be standard chemistry taken from literature,
it was at the time not obvious, that such chemistry could work on such
a highly complex molecule without causing damage to it. Based on
the data of the drugs analysed however, the possibility to patent
around diminishes greatly the efficacy of a process patent to keep
generics companies out of the market. Given the multitude of syn-
thetic strategies which may be chosen to synthesise a given molecule,
patents on processes are amongst those most easily circumvented. As
mentioned above, the key parameter to keep in sight is cost-effec-
tiveness.196
193 Id at 331.
194 See Howard supra note 110 at 232.
195 Kim B. Clark, Steven C. Wheelwright, Managing New Product and Process De-
velopment: Text and Cases, 845-847 (1st ed. 1993).
196 Other factors to be considered involve regulatory and safety obligations.
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New Uses
“[T]he pharmacologist and Nobel laureate James Black said, [that]
the most fruitful basis for the discovery of a new drug is to start with
an old drug.”197 Pharmacokinetics and safety profiles are known and
often approved by regulatory agencies for human use. This factor
renders therefore the evaluation of the newly identified use in phase
II clinical trials more rapid. It has been reported that in light of the
fact that these studies typically last two years and cost $17 million,
the drug companies can “bypass almost 40% of the overall cost of
bringing a drug to market”.198 The repurposing or repositioning of
drugs continues to attract increasing interest. Various known drugs
are currently explored in clinical and animal testing for new indica-
tions.199 By 2007, 24 previously approved active ingredients had been
already repositioned.200
Patent protection of new indications is available in most jurisdic-
tions. In EU such possibility exists since 1985 when the Enlarged
Board of Appeal of the EPO granted to Eisai a patent (in the so-called
Swiss-type claim form) for a second pharmaceutical use of a known
compound.201, 202 Furthermore, the new European Patent Convention
2000 (EPC 2000), explicitly allows second-use claims.203 In practice,
the possibility of the originator company to extend patent protection
on a compound by means of a second medical use claim might be
restricted. The fact that third parties can file applications for second
d)
197 Curtis R. Chong, David J. Sullivan Jr., New Uses for old Drugs, 448 Nature 645,
645 (2007).
198 Id.
199 B. M. Padhy, Y. K. Gupta, Drug repositioning: Re-investigating existing drugs for
new therapeutic indications, 57 J. Postgrad. Med. 153, (2011).
200 See Chong supra note 197.
201 Brian Whitehead, Stuart Jackson, Richard Kempner, Managing generic competi-
tion and patent strategies in the pharmaceutical industry, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. &
Pract. 226, 229 (2008).
202 G 5/83, OJ EPO, 64, 1985.
203 Art. 54 (5) EPC 2000.
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medical uses induces pharmaceutical companies to disclose every
conceivable medical use in the original patent.204
The scope of such patents is also limited to the specific new use.
Originator companies might at maximum stop a generic competitor
from promoting his version of a drug for the new use for example by
advertisements or statements on the package insert or the package
itself. In addition, they cannot prevent medical practitioners from
prescribing for the patented new use a generic product which is al-
ready on the market for an earlier indication.205, 206 Hence, the main
drawback of such patents is the off label use. Moreover, infringement
by a generic company providing the drug but not actively marketing
it for the new indication might be difficult to prove.
In Europe on the other hand, if approval for the new indication is
obtained within 8 years from 1st MA and significant clinical benefits
are shown one additional year of marketing exclusivity can be ob-
tained.207, 208 The second applicant is not allowed to market drugs with
labels for old indications during the protection period. This might
provide a further incentive to invest into such research.
With respect to the two drugs studied in this thesis no major work
has been done in this field by the originator. In the case of Xalatan
investigation into new uses include a method of treatment of multiple
sclerosis209, inner ear diseases210 and in general further eye diseases.
However, this work has been pursued by other companies. As far as
Taxotere is concerned a patent was granted on its use for hepatoma
but Sanofi-Aventis did not sustain this patent in the long run. Only a
few patents have been filed in addition by other companies. On the
other hand the clinical use of docetaxel already covers a broad range
204 See Whitehead supra note 201, at 230.
205 Philip W. Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
220-222 (5th ed. 2010).
206 See Storz supra note 173.
207 Directive 2004/27 EC, art 10 (1), (2),(4), 2004, O.J. (L136) 34.
208 This provision is not retroactive but available only to MA after October 2005.
209 University of Sheffield, US 20020004525.
210 Synphora AB, WO 02/56890.
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of cancer indications and may render obvious new chemotherapeutic
uses.
Concluding, it may be remarked that the left-open possibility to
invent around, the off label use and the possible difficulty to overcome
the inventive step requirement render these patents of lesser commer-
cial value and they do seem neither an effective strategy to support
further investment in research nor an impediment to competition. On
the other side, the additional one year market exclusivity that can be
obtained in Europe by developing a drug with a new medical indica-
tion seems more effective. Profit erosion can indeed be postponed for
one year.
Delivery Devices
The research on delivery systems aims to provide “[...] the right
amount of drug to the right part of the body, at the right time and for
the requisite period.”211 A delivery system different from the standard
route of administration could increase patient convenience and com-
pliance, optimise effects and reduce side effects. The delivery device
might be a crucial component of the delivery system and research
effort has to be placed on its development: for example, the device
needs to be patient-friendly, robust and capable of a reliable release.
An example is the delivery of drugs to the lungs by inhalation.212 In
the case of Xalatan research on various applicators such as aerosol
dischargers213 or a punctual plug214 aimed to address delivery of the
effective amount of the drug directly to the eye.
The main drawback of patents that protect this research is the ease
with which they can be circumvented. Secondly, such research and
e)
211 See Crowley supra note 126, at 539.
212 N. R. Labiris, M. B. Dolovich, Pulmonary drug delivery. Part II: The role of in-
halant delivery devices and drug formulations in therapeutic effectiveness of
aerosolized medications, 56 Br. J. Clin. Pharm. 600, (2003).
213 WO 2004/028421.
214 WO 2007/115259.
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the patents connected to it stem very often by more specialized com-
panies as shown in the Xalatan case study. As already mentioned,215
QLT inc. was one of the more prolific players regarding patent filing
in this field of research. QLT’s patent application (WO 2007/115259)
on nasolacrimal drainage system implants has been granted in U.S.
and Japan while it is still pending in Europe. Phase II clinical studies
of this device showed promising results.216
Patents that cover such delivery devices can only further protect the
use of the concerned drug in connection with the patented system and
do not create any market entry barrier. They do not impede the ad-
ministration to the patient of generic version of the traditional drug or
the use of other versions belonging not to the originator company. The
economic success of such delivery device is more dependent from the
marketing strategy.
Xalatan SPC Request: a Case for Competition Law?
The patent protection (EP 0364417) for Xalatan based on obtained
SPCs was due to end in July 2011. This however was not the case in
Italy where the expiry date was still September 2009 and generic
companies could enter the Italian market already on that date. To
maintain its market position also in Italy, Pfizer in 2002 (13 years after
the parent patent) filed a divisional patent application of the basic
patent (EP 1225168). The patent on the divisional application grant-
ed217 in January 2009 was then validated only in Italy. Successively,
an SPC based on the divisional patent could be requested. This con-
duct fell under scrutiny of the Italian competition authority which
2.
215 See section II B 2 f) of this thesis.
216 Press release, QLT inc., QLT shows positive 4 week efficacy in phase II study for
glaucoma using latanoprost punctual plug delivery system, (Aug. 29, 2011).
217 EP 1225168 was revoked in October 2010 because new findings were added.
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defined it as a complex strategy to avoid generic entrance.218, 219 Ac-
cording to the authorities such strategy allowed to artificially prolong
Xalatan’s protection in Italy from September 2009 to July 2011 and
moreover, due to an additional paediatric extension in various Euro-
pean countries including Italy, to January 2012.
The conduct of Pfizer was strongly criticised by the Italian Com-
petition Authority (ICA). The ICA sustained that this situation deter-
mined a climate of legal uncertainty with respect to the possibility of
commercializing equivalent drugs based on latanoprost. This uncer-
tainty was further increased by numerous warnings sent to the generic
companies concerning an administrative and civil dispute in case of
commercialization of the corresponding generic before July
2011.220 This behaviour was said to have delayed by seven months
the commercialization of generics (Ratiopharm applied later due to
this legal uncertainty) causing a big economic loss to the Italian State
health system (NHS). On the other hand this delay for Pfizer meant a
profit of approximately 17 million Euro (ICA calculation). In a press
release the ICA stated: “Thanks to its strategy, Pfizer managed to: 1)
increase the effective market entry costs for the manufacturers of
generic drugs; 2) delay the market entry of Xalatan-equivalent spe-
cialty drugs by at least 7 months; 3) maintain the de facto exclusive
commercialization of medicines based on latanoprost even after
patent coverage had expired; 4) cause an estimated 14 million Euro
in lost savings by the NHS. These elements led the Authority to clas-
sify the sanctioned competitive violation as very serious.”221
The Italian authorities objected also to the request of paediatric ex-
tension stating that glaucoma is a disease which typically affects old
218 See AGCM supra note 96.
219 Michele Giannino, Patents: Beware of competition law! Relying on patents to ex-
tend protection for medicines may be anticompetitive, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Pract.
391, (2012).
220 Press release, AGCM, Drugs: Pfizer sanctioned with 10.6 million Euro fine for
abuse of a dominant position (Jan. 17, 2012).
221 Id.
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people and therefore this request was also an action with the only
purpose to extend patent protection.222
The ICA relied on the General Court’s judgment in As-
traZeneca223 and argued that such use of administrative procedures
by a dominant company is outside the competition on the merit. How-
ever, some authors comment that Pfizer behaviour is “[...] nothing
more than attempt to rely on the patent and SPC system to protect its
innovative glaucoma treatment across the European Union for the
maximum period allowed by the legislation.”224 Such legislation is
intended to foster innovation and if the available measures of protec-
tion are arbitrarily reduced by competition law incentives to develop
new drugs will be reduced.225 This argument was also raised in the
AstraZeneca case but the then Competition Commissioner Neelie
Kroes commented “[m]isleading regulators to gain longer protection
acts as a disincentive to innovate and is a serious infringement of EU
competition rules.”226 While this statement was objected as being
without support227 it might be remarked that innovation cycles might
be prolonged.
Pfizer appealed the decision and interestingly the Italian adminis-
trative court overruled in its entirety the findings of abuse of a dom-
222 See AGCM supra 96 at ¶ 214.
223 European General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, July 1, 2010,
E.C.R. II-02805.
224 Christopher Stothers, Marco Ramondino, Aftermath of AstraZeneca and the Phar-
maceutical Sector Inquiry: The Big Chill?, 12 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 591, 594 (2011).
225 Id.
226 Press release, IP/05/737, (Jun.15, 2005).
227 Johanna Müller-Graff, Filipe Fischmann, Der Fall AstraZeneca:“Tool boxes“ im
Arzneimittelsektor – wer hat die besseren Werkzeuge und welche sind erlaubt? Zum
Urteil des Gerichts der Europäischen Union vom 1. Juli 2010, Rs. T-321/05, 792
GRUR Int 1, (2010) at 10.
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inant position.228, 229 The court found that, by relying on the provisions
of the EPC and the SPC regulation, Pfizer had been using legal mea-
sures available to it and not carried out procedural abuses or misrep-
resentations. In particular, the court stated that the ICA, by finding
the divisional application abusive with the intent to exclude generic
companies, had not considered that the divisional had been filed seven
years before the supposed generic market entry.230 The Court also
commented that the ICA seemed to have based its decision on the
revocation of the divisional patent by the EPO ignoring that such re-
vocation could be appealed and it was not final.231 The Court’s deci-
sion may still be appealed.232
With its actions (the divisional patent application and the SPC re-
quest based on the divisional) Pfizer tried to remedy a former mistake
and as a consequence to obtain more protection in Italy. Such strategy
used instruments allowed by patent law233 and by the SPC regu-
lation234. From a commercial point of view this behaviour is legiti-
mate, and the Italian administrative court held that it has also legal
bases.
Nonetheless, the AstraZeneca case and the Pfizer case should warn
dominant companies that, by making use of the patent and/or regula-
tory system to delay generic entry and to avoid profit erosion, they
228 Pfizer v AGCM, Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale [Regional Administrative
Court] per il Lazio Sezione Prima, 07467/2012 REG.PROV.COLL., Sept. 4, 2012
available at http://www.giustizia‑amministrativa.it/DocumentiGA/Roma/Sezione
%201/2011/201109968/Provvedimenti/201207467_01.XML (last visited Sept. 12,
2012).
229 For a summary of the decision in English see Micaela Modiano, Italian u-turn on
latanoprost abuse of dominant position dispute, The SPC blog, (Sept 7, 2012)
available at http://thespcblog.blogspot.de/2012/09/italian-u-turn-on-latanoprost-a
buse-of.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
230 See Pfizer supra note 228 at 58.
231 Id at 61.
232 See Modiano supra note 229.
233 R. 25(1) EPC 1973: Filing of divisional application was possible for any pending
application. The rule has since been amended introducing a time limit for filing
divisional applications (R. 36 EPC 2000).
234 The SPC regulation does not draw any distinction between parent and divisional
patent, see Stothers supra note 224.
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might fall under scrutiny of competition law and incur a fine. The use
of certain ways of action permitted by other branches of law235 does
not preclude the application of competition law.236, 237
Finally, a comment needs to be made regarding the objection on
Xalatan paediatric studies.238 Although the percentage of children
who need such drug is low (around 1%) it is duty of the health system
to guarantee that a safe drug is available to them. The scope of pae-
diatric extension is to give an incentive to companies to provide such
drugs, therefore the ICA point of view cannot be shared and Pfizer’s
use of paediatric extension should have not been penalized.
Patent Strategy and Innovation
The main criticisms on pharmaceutical R&D are directed to the re-
duced number of NCEs approved by the FDA and the EMA and to
the reduced number of new breakthrough drugs compared to “me-too
drugs’’ (follow-on drugs). Nonetheless, drugs based on new biologi-
cal mechanisms continue to be discovered (e.g. Isentress the first HIV-
integrase inhibitor introduced by Merck in 2007).239 The reasons for
the apparent reduction of NCEs are various.240 However, these are not
within the scope of the present study.
C.
235 E.g. AstraZeneca deregistered a Marketing Authorisation, which per se is not for-
bidden by the regulations guiding the pharmaceutical market.
236 See AstraZeneca supra note 223 at ¶677.
237 Josef Drexl, Astra Zeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: when do patent filings violate
competition law?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition
Law Research Paper No. 12-02, 21 (2012).
238 Vanessa Peden, Imti Choonara, Brian Gennery, Hilary Done, Recruting Children
to a Clinical Trial, 4 Paed. Perinat. Drug Ther. 75, (2000): “In children, one can
only study those children who are to undergo a clinical procedure and may benefit
from a medicine.”.
239 John E. Calfee, White Paper on Pharmaceutical Market Competition Issues, June
2, 2008, available at http://62.102.106.100/content/default.asp?PageID=559&Do
cID=4894 (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
240 See Chapter I of this thesis.
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Innovation may be regarded as the creation of an improved product.
Based on this understanding, the question arises whether improve-
ments made on existing drugs can be disqualified. The TRIPS agree-
ment states “[...] patents shall be available for any inventions,[...], in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an in-
ventive step and are capable of industrial application. [...] without
discrimination as to [...] the field of technology [...]”.241 Technical
advance in most cases proceeds incrementally and innovators are able
to obtain patents on improvements. Such improvements in the phar-
maceutical field may be of considerable practical significance to pa-
tients and other customers. It has been stated that “[s]ignificant in-
cremental innovation to existing pharmaceutical products has been
occurring in the form of supplementary approvals for new dosages,
formulations, and indications. These innovations account for a sub-
stantial share of drug utilisation and associated economic and medical
benefits. Productivity trends for research and development based on
counts of new molecular entities alone have therefore overlooked an
important source of innovation in pharmaceuticals.”242 As already
mentioned, also the EU Commission in its recent sector inquiry rec-
ognized the importance of subsequent improvements made to the ini-
tial invention.243
For example, patents on drugs combinations are very often criti-
cized with respect to their inventive step. They are often seen by var-
ious interest groups as deviating resources from original research
dedicated to identifying treatments for unmet medical conditions.
However, advances made in the field of the so-called combination
therapies are in many therapeutic areas indispensable (e.g. viral dis-
eases or cancer) as already mentioned earlier.244 Combination thera-
pies can have superior effect compared to the single components. In
241 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994.
242 Ernst R. Berndt, Iain M. Cockburn, Karen A. Grepin, The impact of Incremental
Innovation in Biopharmaceutical, 24 Pharmacoeconomics 69, (2006).
243 See sector inquiry supra note 120.
244 See section IV A 4 of this thesis.
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the case of Latanoprost, research into drug combinations has been
carried out, as no drug modulating the intraocular pressure was able
alone to address the needs of the complete (and growing) patient pop-
ulation. While achieving an average reduction in eye internal pressure
of about 30% by treatment with Latanoprost results to be sufficient in
the majority of the patients, there is however a significant patient
subpopulation, where this reduction of ocular hypertension still does
not lead to a curative effect. Xalacom (Latanoprost plus Timolol) al-
lows reducing further the intraocular pressure in patients where Xala-
tan alone has an insufficient effect.245 This demonstrates that research
carried out in this area is of interest to the public and thus patents are
important to incentivise investment in such research. On the other
hand, patent law should guarantee that only for demonstrated new
increments companies will receive exclusivity. Patent protection on
Xalacom could not be obtained because the originator company had
been publishing more than 2 years before the priority date the results
of a clinical study demonstrating exactly the unexpected over-additive
(synergistic) effect.246, 247
Research in formulation attracts similar criticisms. The new and
improved composition aimed for in the case of docetaxel tried to
overcome a safety issue. As the drug in its original formulation is
dosed intravenously in a solution with a fairly high content of ethanol,
in some cases the occurrence of alcohol intoxication during infusion
was observed.248 These events were particularly pronounced in pa-
tients with a history of alcohol dependence.249 The identification of a
low-alcohol formulation could provide the patient benefit needed and
remediate the problem noticed and therefore, cannot be seen as a de-
245 William C. Stewart, Combination Therapy: Is the Whole Greater?, Rev. Ophthal-
mol., Jun. 15 2005.
246 See Diestelhorst supra note 82.
247 This demonstrates the importance of an effective internal review process prior to
external publication to hold back important research results until a patent applica-
tion has been filed.
248 Supra note 41.
249 Anonymous, Docetaxel: Alcoholic intoxication due to alcohol excipient: case re-
port, Reactions Weekly 13, Issue 1375 (Oct. 9, 2011).
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viation of resources. This improved composition was subsequently
patented, investigated in clinical trials and market authorisation was
obtained. However, the patent family protecting this improvement got
under fire by generic drug providers and in the end got revoked or was
held unenforceable. In this context, it is important to note, that the
revocation due to obviousness was mainly caused by the drafting of
the patent application and especially its claims which on one hand did
not take sufficient account of pre-existing own patents and on the
other hand left room for interpretation.250 In summary, the originator
had basically failed to protect his new invention by not delimiting it
sufficiently clear from the prior art.
In addition, competition is fostered because further innovation is
open to anyone. For example with respect to Xalatan first, several
follow-on drugs based on prostaglandine derivatives have been de-
veloped by various companies (e.g Saflutan, Travatan, Lumigan); and
second, further studies on improved formulations attempting to ad-
dress side effects were sponsored mainly by competitors, as already
mentioned.251
Summary: Taxotere v Xalatan
A comparison of the originator filing activity concerning the two
drugs Taxotere and Xalatan can be made. Successive to the filing of
their respective basic patent, activity in the different areas of research
was correlated to the studies necessary for their commercialization:
in particular formulations, process and drug combinations in the case
of Taxotere and formulations, process and delivery devices in the case
of Xalatan.
In the case of Taxotere, the originator company’s filing activity
continued up to the expiry date of the basic patent (2011). In its later
phase it was mainly directed to the finding of more practicable for-
D.
250 See Aventis supra note 145.
251 See section IV B 1 a) of this thesis.
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mulations improving patient comfort and moreover to the discovery
of new combinations which could give better therapy results both in
term of reduced side effects and patient response. Instead, in the case
of Xalatan filing activity was observable during the first 15 years,
ending however completely in 2003. The activity following the drug’s
launch from 1996 to 2003 was directed mainly to the discovery of
new delivery devices to improve application of the drug and to new
combinations. Another difference is the number of patent applications
directed to the identification of alternative compounds resembling the
structure of Taxotere (i.e. derivatives of the taxan core) while in the
Xalatan case, such research does account for a more limited number
of applications. This may be attributed to the different disease target-
ed. Since cancer cells may become resistant to a drug, there is a great
need to identify alternative compounds.
In both cases there is strong indication that the filing of patents
successive to the basic patent was not of any help in prolonging ex-
clusivity after the end of the due protection. Most of the patent appli-
cations concerning new combinations of either Xalatan or Taxotere
were not granted, leaving the commercialization of some important
combinations open also to competitors and generic companies. Tax-
otere formulation patents were mostly attacked on grounds of inva-
lidity due to obviousness and subsequently restricted and/or revoked.
Patent applications regarding delivery devices for Xalatan were equal-
ly largely unsuccessful, as ocular delivery devices were known in the
art, and no specific effects deriving from or influence on the use of
Xalatan in such devices could be demonstrated.
Patents in the area of derivatives may be regarded as not having any
influence on the marketed drug, neither during the monopoly time,
nor at the later stage. Such patents may however be of significant value
when the need arises to identify an improved version or a follow-on
drug. In fact, this has happened in the Taxotere case, where upon
expiry of the patent protection for docetaxel, the drug Jevtana252 has
been introduced into the market by Sanofi. In 2011, sales of Jevtana
252 See this thesis at § III A 2 f).
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increased by 135.4% reaching 188 million.253 However, as this drug
is currently used as a second line treatment after Docetaxel it “is not
expected to become a blockbuster with sales on par with [...] Tax-
otere”.254
In both the presented case studies the used strategy did not help to
avoid profit erosion after the generic market entrance. Concerning
Taxotere it was announced: “As expected, sales of Taxotere® de-
clined significantly (‑67.5% to €150 million) in the fourth quarter,
reflecting generic erosion in the U.S. (sales down 90.4% to €14 mil-
lion) and Western Europe (sales decreased 84.2% to €23 million). Full
year 2011 sales of Taxotere® were €922 million, down 57.0%.”255
With respect to the second example analyzed in this thesis it appears
that after commercialization of follow-on drugs although market
shares declined256 sales were maintained at high level257 probably due
to the growth of the patient base. However, with the generic entrance
in 2011 sales decreased by two thirds.258 The data for the two brand
drugs relying on the latanoprost patent, Xalatan itself and Xalacom
(latanoprost/timolol), indicates a decline of sales in the U.S. by two
thirds to US $ 159 million in the first nine months of 2011. During
the same period in Europe where SPC protection ended in January
2012 10% reduction of the sales was observed.259 It has also been
reported that in the near future the glaucoma therapeutics market will
be dominated by generic drugs. New me-too drugs or product exten-
sion will likely not be able to capture a significant market share if they
offer a safety and efficacy profile only slightly better than the mar-
253 Press release, Sanofi, 2011 Results Benefit from Genzyme Acquisition Net Sales
and Business EPS1 up 9.2%2 in Q4 (Feb. 8, 2012), at 3.
254 Jessica Merrill, 2010 Drug Launches: A Year of Firsts Offers Hope for a Re-
bound, 11 The Pink Sheet, Jan. 3, 2011, at 3.
255 Supra note 253.
256 Jeff Viksjo, Pharmaceutical Treatments in Ophthalmology, 1 Healthcare Observer
2, 3 (2009).
257 Anonymous, News & highlights from week 40, 12 Curr. Pat. Gaz. 1, (2009).
258 Anonymous, Latanoprost SPC ends in top EU markets, Generics bulletin, Jan. 13,
2012, at 24.
259 Supra note 258.
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keted drugs. This situation could change only by the development of
drugs with novel mechanism of action targeting the cause of the dis-
ease.260
Conclusion and Suggestions
A common theme in both case studies is that subsequent patent ap-
plications by the respective originator companies failed to adequately
protect further advances (too early publication of own results and
patent drafting). More care needs to be taken in regards of existing
prior art. As already mentioned the invention must be more clearly
delimited and the claims should me more specific to have a better
chance to overcome obviousness requirements and to sustain an in-
validity attack. Very important is also an effective document clear-
ance inside the company to avoid novelty problems caused by pre-
publication as in the case of Xalatan.
In addition in the case of research on combination patents that aim
to protect these results would be more useful and valuable if the com-
bination could be administered in a single formulation. In this way
the problem of off label use could be avoided.
Finally, because these secondary patents are often a weak strategy
to cover investment in research a possible additional incentive could
be a longer time of marketing exclusivity for a demonstrated clinical
benefit as the additional year for a new use available in Europe.
E.
260 Anonymous, Patent expiries to hit glaucoma drug market growth until 2018, The
Pharma Letter, Sept. 18, 2011.
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Final Remarks
The purpose of this work was to highlight a few points concerning
lifecycle management which is very often considered an issue and
sometimes labelled as “evergreening”.261 First, critics of this business
model argue that secondary patents prolong the monopoly the origi-
nator holds on a drug at a cost for society.262 In both the cases at
present analysed this could not be confirmed. Also in cases of exam-
ples where secondary patents led to commercial success, like the pro-
tection of Symbicort (Asthma treatment: combination of budesonide/
formoterol), it needs to be stressed that such a patent does not con-
stitute a unilateral advantage for the originator company.263 This is
for two reasons: first, society has the choice between the classical and
the improved treatment and second, any third party, desiring to pro-
vide the original drug not anymore covered by a patent, is free to offer
it to the market and to compete with the originator or others.
The second argument voiced against lifecycle management is that
the originator companies put their efforts only on maintaining exclu-
sivity on old blockbusters and not invest in NCEs. However, this ar-
gument fails to acknowledge that a successful product has to generate
revenue for a multitude of unsuccessful projects.264 In this context it
has also been remarked: “A study by the U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission indicates that brand-name companies currently file more
patents to protect market exclusivity of their products. However, a
few companies are using these frivolous patenting [strategies] to ob-
V.
261 John R. Thomas, Patent “Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition,
Congressional Research Service, (Nov. 13, 2009): this article highlights the debate
on lifecycle management.
262 Kristof Roox, Julia Pike, Andrew Brown, Stefan Becker, Patent-related Barriers
to Market Entry for Generic Medicines in the European Union, 12 (Kristof Roox
ed., 2008): publication of the European Generic Medicines Association.
263 See AstraZeneca supra note 187.
264 See Jacob supra note 13.
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tain market exclusivity to such an extent that these strategies may be
referred to as abuse.”265, 266 While there are surely exceptions, one
needs to keep in mind that also small increments might constitute
innovation, and address so far unmet needs as was demonstrated
throughout this thesis.
Another criticism raised is that the further filing increases costs as
these might cover essential aspects of the marketed product such as a
specific formulation or manufacturing process, for which substitutes
need to be developed. However, this argumentation falls short of its
target.267 Emphasis should be placed on the research and development
cost. The development cost of a new drug is very high, the develop-
ment of a new use still has a considerable cost also if reduced (due
the clinical trials needed to prove efficacy), while on the other hand
the costs of simply reproducing the drug is very low.268
On the other side, it must be conceded that if such granted secondary
patents are of low quality this creates additional strain on resources.
This cannot be considered a specific issue of secondary patents in the
field of pharmaceuticals but in principle regards all patents also if data
reported might sustain such arguments.269
As has been shown by performing the two case studies it oftentimes
is a major problem to overcome own prior art and secondary patents
are more vulnerable due to the increased knowledge in the public do-
265 V. N. Bhat, The Challenges of the new EU Pharmaceutical legislation Pharmaceu-
ticals Policy and Law, Volume 6, 109-122 (J. L. Valverde, P. Wassenberg eds.,
1st ed. 2005) at 118.
266 The “frivolous” patents mentioned in this context refer for example to pill boxes or
computerized dispensing systems for specific drugs.
267 If a drug product could only be protected via the coverage of its active ingredient,
any investment into the identification of an efficient process of production or a
“patient-friendly” formulation could be considered to be without return and there-
fore not worth making. If on the other hand such an investment is made but not
incentivised or protected, then the use of the results of such research would con-
stitute a form of “free-riding”, which may not be considered to be a competition on
the merits.
268 See Bhat supra note 265.
269 See sector inquiry supra note 120.
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main. Therefore, more care is needed in drafting such patents. In ad-
dition, they might not be the best way to incentivise research on im-
provements of existing drugs. Other instruments like an additional
market exclusivity period for a proven real benefit might be an op-
tion.270
The two case studies demonstrate that the originator companies
concentrate their filing activities mostly during the premarketing pe-
riod when there is not yet any guarantee of an impending commercial
success, in some cases not even of a successful passing of the clinical
trials. The spread of the patents over a period of many years also re-
flects the fact that the basic patent must be filed as early as possible
when not all the research has been already done. The patent filing after
the successful marketing of the drug derives from a multitude of en-
tities of which the originator is only one. In addition, the large number
of patents applications withdrawn by the originator company or not
granted, demonstrate that the patent system works to effectivly filter
the applications, as desired by the Commission in its Pharmaceutical
Sector Inquiry.271
In summary, it is believed, that the case studies do not indicate the
presence of “evergreening” strategies, but reflect the normal course
pharmaceutical research is taking, where one step follows the other,
and investment into a certain aspect or another is done according to
the needs of the project until it arrives at the stage of marketing au-
thorisation. While this filing strategy may be partially attributed to an
interest in not losing a market position gained, at the same time the
research done is a benefit to the public and may not be meaningfully
carried out at an earlier point in time. In stating this however, it must
not be neglected that sometimes the strategies used stretch the limits
of competition on the merit.
270 A similar conclusion has been reached in: Manfred E. Wolff, Drug Discovery Mar-
ket Exclusivity After KSR: The Challenge to Pharmaceutical Scientists and the US
Congress, 100 J. Pharm. Sci. 3044, 3052-3053 (2011).
271 See sector inquiry supra note 120.
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